









UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF LEGISLATION: AN INQUIRY 
INTO THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 194 OF THE LABOUR 
RELATIONS ACT 
MINOR DISSERTATION PRESENTED FOR THE DEGREE OF 
MASTER OF LAWS 
By Minor Dissertation with Coursework 
Labour Law Specialisation 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCIAL LAW
FACULTY OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN 
Supervised by 




22 722 WORDS 
MARCH 2016 
The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 












1. I know that plagiarism is wrong. Plagiarism is to use another’s work and
pretend that it is one’s own.
2. I have used the footnote convention for citation and referencing. Each
contribution to, and quotation in this dissertation from the work(s) of other
people has been attributed, and has been cited and referenced.
3. This essay is my own work.
4. I have not allowed, and will not allow, anyone to copy my work with the
intention of passing it off as his or her own work.
5. I acknowledge that copying someone else’s work, or part of it, is wrong, and
declare that this is my own work.
Signature ______________________________ 
Research dissertation presented for the approval of Senate in fulfillment of part of 
the requirements for the Master of Laws: Labour Law Specialisation in approved 
courses and a minor dissertation.  The other part of the requirement for this 
qualification was the completion of a programme of courses. 
I hereby declare that I have read and understood the regulations governing the 
submission of Master of Laws: Labour Law Specialisation dissertations, including 
those relating to length and plagiarism, as contained in the rules of this University, 
and that this dissertation conforms to those regulations. 







First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisor, Associate Professor Debbie 
Collier. Her encouragement, guidance, and insights were invaluable in the 
completion of this dissertation. It was a privilege to be supervised by an academic of 
her calibre, and a person for whom I have the greatest respect. 
 
I would also like to extend my gratitude to the friends and colleagues who took time 
out of their busy days to read previous versions of this dissertation in order to 
provide me with feedback. 
 
Lastly, I would like to thank each member of my family for their unrelenting support. 
However, I would like to dedicate my dissertation to one member in particular, my 
late father. A man whose insatiably inquisitive mind inspired my academic path and 









A fundamental adjustment to our perspectives on the systemic inequalities that exist in 
South Africa is necessary. Our seemingly neutral laws need to be reassessed to fully 
understand their practical impact. Section 194 of the Labour Relations Act provides an 
overtly neutral law in the form of a limitation on the compensation awardable in employment 
matters. The limitation is the equivalent of either 12 or 24 month’s remuneration. The text 
expresses that compensation must be ‘just and equitable’, but subject to the limitation. The 
judges and commissioners that have heard such employment matters have taken this 
concept of ‘just and equitable’ and interpreted it to either mean recovering loss suffered, or 
fairness on a sliding scale of 1 to 12 or 1 to 24 months’ remuneration, depending on the 
case. This dissertation will argue that any text or interpretation of section 194 that utilises 
remuneration as its sole measurement, is constitutionally invalid. This is because systemic 
racial and gender inequality in South Africa prevent a free market of opportunity concerning 
the salaries available to a statistically significant number of women and black persons. The 
provision in question may not directly intend to differentiate between races and genders, but 
the indirect effect of the text and interpretation of section 194 is to cause disproportionate 
disadvantage to certain groups of persons. This dissertation will use case law to bring the 
unjust impact of section 194 to light; it will then suggest that any use of remuneration as a 
standard or measure will always create a prima facie case of unfair discrimination on the 
grounds of race and gender – at least in our country’s current economic circumstances. The 
essential point is that differentiation on the ground of remuneration is inherently indirectly 
discriminatory, and will, therefore, always require justification for its use. This dissertation will 
then go on to inquire into the constitutionality within the context of section 194 – ultimately, 
the conclusion is that the current interpretation which quantifies compensation solely in 
terms of remuneration, as well as the text of the limitation on compensation that limits in 
terms of remuneration, cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny. This is followed by 
recommendations on how to move forward within the bounds of the Constitution. Racial and 
Gender inequality are embedded within the fabric of South Africa. It is imperative that we 
reassess the unintended effects of our laws if we are to achieve one of the fundamental 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
 
A fundamental adjustment to our perspectives on the systemic inequalities that exist 
in South Africa is necessary. Our seemingly neutral laws need to be reassessed to 
fully understand their practical impact. This notion is of particular relevance now 
more than ever when not only are entities, nationally, calling out for transformation, 
but Parliament has convened a panel to review the practical impacts of post-1994 
laws.1 Parliament is confronted with the question of: why there is no evidence to 
support the realisation of transformation when the structures seeking equality are 
ostensibly in place? This dissertation will aim to shed light on the importance of this 
question by exposing an unforeseen consequence of a post-1994 law. In so doing, 
this dissertation will pursue a constitutional challenge to a law that has never 
previously been proposed.  
 
The purpose of this dissertation is two-fold. First, it will be established that 
differentiation on the ground of remuneration triggers prima facie unfair 
discrimination. Second, the judicial interpretation and text of s 194 of the Labour 
Relations Act2 which utilises remuneration differentiation, will be scrutinised and 
found to unfairly discriminate due the disproportionate disadvantage caused in a 
manner which cannot be justified. 
 
                                            
1 Thulani Gqirana, News24 ‘Parliament to Review Impact of Post-1994 Laws’ (2016). Available at 
http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/parliament-to-review-impact-of-post-1994-laws-20160119 
[Accessed 2 March 2016]. 
2 Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. Hereafter referred to as the ‘LRA’. Section 194 of the LRA is 
pivotal to this dissertation. This will be dealt with in detail in Chapter V below; however, it will benefit 
understanding to reproduce this section at this early stage: 
“194 Limits on Compensation 
(1) The compensation awarded to an employee whose dismissal is found to be unfair because 
the employer did not prove that the reason for dismissal was a fair reason relating to the 
employee’s conduct or capacity or the employer’s operational requirements or the employer did 
not follow a fair procedure, or both, must be just and equitable in all the circumstances, but may 
not be more than the equivalent of 12 months’ remuneration calculated at the employee’s rate 
of remuneration on the date of dismissal. 
(2) … 
(3) The compensation awarded to an employee whose dismissal is automatically unfair must be 
just and equitable in all the circumstances, but not more than the equivalent of 24 months’ 
remuneration calculated at the employee’s rate of remuneration on the date of dismissal. 
(4) The compensation awarded to an employee in respect of an unfair labour practice must be just 





Section 194 of the LRA provides an overtly neutral law in the form of a limitation 
on the compensation awardable in employment matters. The limitation is the 
equivalent of either 12 or 24 months’ remuneration. The text expresses that 
compensation must be ‘just and equitable’, but subject to the limitation. The judges 
and commissioners that have heard such employment matters have taken this 
concept of ‘just and equitable’ and interpreted it to either mean recovering loss 
suffered, or fairness on a sliding scale of 1 to 12 or 1 to 24 months’ remuneration, 
depending. This dissertation will argue that any text or interpretation of section 194 
that solely utilises remuneration in its measurement, is constitutionally invalid. This is 
because systemic racial and gender inequality in South Africa prevent a free market 
of opportunity concerning the salaries available to a statistically significant number of 
women and black persons.3 The provision in question may not directly intend to 
differentiate between races and genders, but the indirect effect of the text and 
interpretation of section 194 is to cause disproportionate disadvantage to certain 
groups of persons. 
 
 The concept of indirect discrimination caused by a statute which differentiates 
between persons in terms of their remuneration, where the statute operates within a 
social reality of racialised income inequality, has previously been posited by Alan 
Rycroft.4 Rycroft’s argument related to the Workmen’s Compensation Act,5 which, 
amongst other things, computed workers’ compensation based on their earnings.6 
Rycroft stated that since black workers constitute the lowest paid race group, 
compensation may be discriminatory as black workers sustaining an injury will 
                                            
3 Sampie Terreblanche A History of Inequality in South Africa 1652-2002 1ed (2002) 391-392; The 
Minister in the Presidency Responsible for Women with the Development Policy Research Unit ‘The 
Status of Women in the South African Economy’ August 2015 at p 67. Accessible at 
http://www.gov.za/documents/status-women-south-african-economy-9-aug-2015-0000 [Accessed 17 
January 2016]. 
4 Alan Rycroft ‘Unfair Discrimination in Employment’ (1990) 1 South African Human Rights Yearbook 
371. ‘Indirect discrimination’ is defined in Section 1 of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of 
Discrimination Act 4 of 2000: “discrimination means any act or omission, including a policy, law, rule, 
practice, condition or situation which directly or indirectly – (a) imposes burdens, obligations or 
disadvantage on; or (b) withholds benefits, opportunities or advantages from, any person on one or 
more of the prohibited grounds.” Also see Iain Currie & Johan de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 
5ed (2010) 260 and Leonard Dingler Employee Representative Council v Leonard Dingler (Pty) Ltd 
and Others (1998) 19 ILJ 285 (LC) at 292. This concept will be further discussed in Chapter III. 
5 Workmen’s Compensation Act 30 of 1941. 





necessarily be compensated less than white workers – for the same injury.7 The Act 
has since been repealed. 
 
 The Employment Equity Act8 also has relevance to this dissertation. Section 
50(2)(a) of the EEA provides for the Labour Court’s power to order compensation 
payable to the employee in the event that the employer is found to have unfairly 
discriminated against him or her. An important distinction from the LRA is that 
compensation awarded under the EEA is not subject to any limitation on the 
awardable value. Therefore, to the extent that this dissertation will attack the 
constitutionality of the LRA’s limitation on compensation in Chapter V, this is not 
relevant to the EEA. However, the aspects of this dissertation discussed in Chapters 
IV and VI concerning the challenge to the interpretation that has been imposed on 
the calculation of compensation, are directly relevant to the EEA as well as the LRA. 
This dissertation should be interpreted to apply to the EEA, in addition to the LRA, in 
that regard. 
 
 This dissertation consists of seven chapters. In Chapter II, it will use case law to 
bring the unjust impact of section 194 to light. Thereafter, in Chapter III, it will 
establish that any use of remuneration as a standard or measure of differentiation 
will always trigger a prima facie case of unfair discrimination on the grounds of race 
and gender. This conclusion will be reached until our country’s current economic 
circumstances alters substantially. The essential point is that remuneration is 
inherently discriminatory, and will, therefore, always require justification for its use. 
This dissertation will go on to inquire into the constitutionality within the context of 
section 194 of the LRA in Chapters IV and V. Ultimately, the conclusion in Chapter 
IV is that the current interpretation of the section which quantifies compensation 
solely in terms of remuneration cannot be justified. Additionally, in Chapter V, the 
text of the section in limiting compensation in terms of remuneration, also cannot 
withstand constitutional scrutiny. Chapter VI follows the above conclusions by 
making recommendations on how to move forward within the bounds of the 
Constitution.9 Finally, in Chapter VII, this dissertation concludes that racial and 
                                            
7 Ibid. 
8 Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998. Hereafter referred to as the ‘EEA’. 





gender inequality are embedded within the fabric of South Africa. It is imperative that 
we reassess the unintended effects of our laws if we are to achieve one of the 
fundamental goals of the Constitution: equality.10 
 
CHAPTER II: ILLUSTRATING THE PROBLEM THROUGH CASE LAW 
 
Potential challenges to the constitutionality of s 194 of the LRA are revealed in the 
process of reading relevant case law. When the race and gender of the employee in 
the case is examined, trends emerge. A trend such as black women receiving 
relatively high awards in terms of months of remuneration, but these translate into 
negligible awards in real monetary terms. Then a corresponding trend in white men 
receiving a full range of awards in terms of months of remuneration, but the award in 
real monetary terms is always sizeable due to high monthly salaries. However, only 
four South African cases and one foreign case will be discussed to illustrate the 
problems caused by quantifying compensation and limiting compensation in terms of 
remuneration. 
 
The point of departure is an analysis of two cases which demonstrate how 
seemingly generous awards can result in negligible real sums when an employee is 
poorly remunerated. The case of Masondo v Crossway11 involved a black female 
employee who worked full days, six days per week, performing various jobs for her 
employer in his grocery and bakery business.12 It was established practice that the 
employee worked her shifts during the day. She then became pregnant and took 
maternity leave. When she returned, the employer informed her that he had been left 
with no choice, but to retrench an employee. The employee selected had been the 
one that had regularly worked the night shift. Therefore, the employer informed her 
that she would now need to work the night shift. The employer insisted this 
regardless of the fact that there were other employees that did not have protected 
reasons for not wanting to work late hours.13 The employee, a new mother, refused 
                                            
10 The Constitution specifically pursues ‘substantive equality’. This concept specifically advocates for 
different treatment of persons when equal treatment would serve to further embed inequality. Section 
9(2) of the Constitution legitimises this approach to equality. See Minister of Finance and Others v 
Van Heerden 2004 (6) SA 121 (CC) at para 27. 
11 Masondo v Crossway (1998) 19 ILJ 171 (CCMA). Hereafter referred to as ‘Masondo’. 
12 Ibid at p 171. 





to work the night shift due to her family responsibilities to her child.14 Despite 
explaining the extent of her circumstances that prevented her from working night 
shifts, her employer insisted that she work at that time. Therefore, the employee 
resigned as she felt she had no other options available.15 The employer could give 
no more reason than: he designed the shift schedule in the manner that he did 
because it was his preference.16  
 
The commissioner found that the employer had unfairly discriminated against the 
employee on the ground of family responsibility, and held that the dismissal was an 
automatically unfair constructive dismissal.17 Section 194 of the LRA permitted the 
commissioner to order compensation that may not exceed the equivalent of 24 
months’ remuneration.18 The reasoning in Masondo concerning quantifying 
compensation considered the remuneration loss of the employee as well as the 
unfairness of the employer’s conduct. The commissioner argued that as the 
employee had been unemployed for 6 months, she is entitled to the payment of that 
outstanding remuneration. The commissioner did not take into consideration that she 
had been unable to find alternative employment. Furthermore, the employer had 
acted offensively, but awarding compensation greater than an additional 6 months 
would be punitive to the employer.19 The employee was awarded 12 months’ 
remuneration, which equated to the trivial value of R12 000.20 
 
A more recent case, with a similar result, is the case of Ekhamanzi Springs (Pty) 
Ltd v Mnomiya.21 The employee was a black female who worked as a general 
assistant at the employer’s factory – the factory was rented from the owner of the 
land, which was an organisation of religious affiliation.22 In order to gain access to 
the factory, an employee would have to use the entrance to the land owner’s 
property and enter through the gate manned by security personnel. These guards 
                                            
14 Ibid at p 174. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid at p 176. 
17 Ibid at p 181. 
18 Section 194(3) of the LRA. 
19 Supra note 11 at p 181. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ekhamanzi Springs (Pty) Ltd v Mnomiya (2014) 35 ILJ 2388 (LAC). Hereafter referred to as 
‘Mnomiya’. 





were instructed to deny entrance to persons that exhibited certain forms of behaviour 
that were disapproved of by the land owner.23 Many types of behaviour would 
prevent an employee’s entering the estate, but, specifically, persons who are 
involved in sexual relationships outside of marriage were not permitted entry.24 The 
employee became pregnant and she was unmarried. Once this came to the attention 
of the security guards, they disallowed her from entering the premises to fulfil her 
employee duties and she was told she would not be permitted to enter in future – her 
employer was present and did nothing to assist her.25 She protested and told her 
employer that he was effectively dismissing her; therefore, she would like a letter to 
that effect, but this was denied.26  
 
The court reasoned that denying an employee access to the premises to fulfil her 
duties as an employee amounted to dismissing her. Furthermore, as the reason for 
denying her entry – and, therefore, the reason for her dismissal – was her 
pregnancy, the dismissal fell to be declared automatically unfair.27 The court in 
Mnomiya noted that the prohibition of unfair discrimination on the grounds of 
pregnancy is not a right preserved for married women.28 The judge upheld the 
decision of the court a quo, which awarded the employee twelve months’ 
compensation.29 Twelve months, at the rate of remuneration at the time of dismissal, 
resulted in in the employee being awarded a total sum of R7945 for a case involving 
discrimination.30 
 
Moving on to the cases falling on the other side of the spectrum – where 
awarding compensation quantified or limited in terms of months of remuneration can 
result in excessively large sums. The first example of this is Hibbert v ARB Electrical 
Wholesalers (Pty) Ltd31 which involved a white male employee of 64 years of age 
who worked as an external sales person whom went out of the office to gain new 
                                            
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid at paras 3-4. 
26 Ibid at para 3. 
27 Ibid at paras 33-34. 
28 Ibid at para 24. 
29 Ibid at paras 1 and 34. 
30 Ibid at para 1. 






clients.32 The employer asserted that the normal retirement age for the company was 
64 years; therefore, the employer sought to terminate the employee’s employment 
contract on the grounds that the employee had reached retirement age – the 
employer claimed to not intend this to be a dismissal.33 The case revolved around 
the disagreement between the parties of whether there was a normal retirement age 
that had been agreed to, and what the normal retirement age was – if one existed.34 
Several factors led to the differing beliefs between the parties. There was a provident 
fund that stipulated the normal retirement age of 64 years; however, the employee 
was never a member of this fund. Furthermore, there had been employees 
previously that had retired after the age of 64 years.35  
 
The court ruled that the employer had not been able to establish a case that 
there was a normal or agreed retirement age for the employee; therefore, the judge 
found that the employee had been dismissed. This meant that the dismissal was 
automatically unfair due to discrimination on the ground of age.36 The court 
acknowledged the compensation limitation in the LRA of the equivalent of 24 
months’ remuneration in the case of automatically unfair dismissals.37 The judge 
imposed an award that only took account of the remuneration loss of the employee. 
The employee expected to retire at the age of 65 years, he was denied one more 
year of income. The judge reasoned that this was not a particularly unfair 
automatically unfair dismissal and awarded the lost remuneration the employee 
would have earned. The award was for the equivalent of 12 months’ remuneration, 
which equated to a large sum of R420 000.38 
 
The next case demonstrates how one of the smallest awards in terms of months 
of remuneration can be equivalent to a significant award if the employee is in a high-
earning position. The employee in the case of Solidarity on behalf of de Vries and 
Denel (Pty) Ltd t/a Denel Land Systems39 was, again, a white male who was 
                                            
32 Ibid at para 8. 
33 Ibid at paras 1-4. 
34 Ibid at para 15. 
35 Ibid at paras 7 and 10. 
36 Ibid at paras 22-23. 
37 Ibid at para 31; Section 194(3) of the LRA. 
38 Ibid at paras 31 and 36. 
39 Solidarity on behalf of de Vries and Denel (Pty) Ltd t/a Denel Land Systems (2009) 30 ILJ 2210 





employed as a technician working for a branch of the company located in the United 
Arab Emirates.40 The dispute began when the employee committed acts of gross 
misconduct. A problem had occurred with a piece of equipment and a member of the 
technician team questioned the team, as a whole, why a certain procedure had not 
been followed. The employee then became enraged and began verbally abusing the 
fellow technician. The verbal abuse included degrading racist language and threats 
to injure his colleague’s person.41 The victimised technician reported the incident to 
his supervisor, and the employer began the process of initiating a disciplinary 
enquiry.  
 
At the hearing, the employee was found guilty of misconduct and various 
punishments were implemented, including: requiring the employee apologise to the 
other technician, giving the employee a final written warning, and disqualifying the 
employee from receiving his upcoming salary increase.42 However, the victim of the 
abuse was not satisfied with level of punishment awarded given the severity of the 
employee’s actions. The victim pursued the matter and took the grievance further up 
the corporate ladder. His efforts resulted in the employer holding another disciplinary 
enquiry for the misconduct of the employee.43 However, this hearing was 
compromised by the person chairing the enquiry. The chair claimed that the same 
punishment ordered as before was appropriate because the employee and the victim 
have reconciled. Later, evidence came to light that the victim had been coerced by 
the chair to accept the apology, and yet another disciplinary enquiry was initiated to 
decide the matter correctly.44 The same charges of misconduct came before a new 
chair and he determined that the appropriate order was dismissal – the employee 
was dismissed with one month’s notice.45  
 
The commissioner considered the reasons the employer was able to put forward 
for conducting additional disciplinary enquiries, but the commissioner found these 
reasons wanting. The additional disciplinary enquiries were unfair and rendered the 
                                            
40 Ibid at p 2212. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid at p 2213. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid at pp 2214-2215. 





dismissal of the employee procedurally unfair.46 The commissioner further argued 
that the dismissal was substantively unfair as the previous punishments were not 
revoked before the new punishment of dismissal was ordered. This resulted in the 
employee being punished twice for the same misconduct.47 The commissioner then 
considered the relevant factors to determining the value of the compensation to be 
awarded. He took into account all relevant factors, from the problematic conduct of 
the employer in dealing with the misconduct, to the appalling nature of the 
misconduct committed by the employee.48 The commissioner decided that an award 
equivalent to one month’s remuneration would be just and equitable in the 
circumstances. However, because the employee held a very highly remunerated 
position, this seemingly insignificant award had the monetary value of R46 000. 
 
 These cases illustrate the problem with the remuneration-based limitations in 
section 194 of the LRA as well as the manner in which courts have interpreted the 
section to quantify compensation. When racial and gender inequality are entrenched 
into the economy, as is the case in South Africa currently, a statistically significant 
number of black persons and women will disproportionately benefit less than white 
persons and men from any structure that utilises remuneration as its measure.49 The 
fact that the employees in the cases of Masondo and Mnomiya were limited in their 
claims for remuneration at a rate grossly less than the employees in Hibbert and 
Solidarity obo de Vries from the moment they stepped into conciliation cannot be 
defended. The employees in Masondo and Mnomiya, even if they received the 
maximum compensation available to them of the equivalent of 24 months’ 
remuneration, they were still limited to less than either of the employees in Hibbert 
and Solidarity obo de Vries would have received if they were awarded the equivalent 
of a single month’s remuneration.  
 
 Masondo and Mnomiya involved fairly notable cases of discrimination amongst 
the claim, whereas the other cases involved little or no discrimination. Yet, because 
                                            
46 Ibid at p 2222. 
47 Ibid at p 2224. 
48 Ibid. 
49 The Minister in the Presidency Responsible for Women with the Development Policy Research Unit 
‘The Status of Women in the South African Economy’ August 2015 at p 67. Accessible at 






of the limitations placed on compensation being valued in terms of remuneration, 
and some judicial officers opting to approach quantification of compensation by 
measuring the sum in terms of remuneration, the awards provided to the lower paid 
employees were disproportionately low and the higher paid employees’ were 
disproportionately high. 
 
 Before an analysis of relevant legal principles is conducted, it benefits a 
discussion of proposed legislative change to consider the case law of a foreign 
jurisdiction.  
 
(a) Acknowledgment from the United States 
 
As early as 1969, the United States had accepted the idea of the realities of a 
racially unequal economy revealing indirect discrimination within seemingly neutral 
laws of literacy testing. In April of 1969, the case of Gaston County, North Carolina v 
United States50 came before the Supreme Court of the United States and brought 
such issues to light. Previously, in the United States, the law enforced the sitting of a 
literacy test for persons of voting age and who wished to register to vote for an 
election.51 This was then abolished in 1964 when Congress passed legislation 
suspending the use of any tests as prerequisites to being eligible to vote.52 This law 
was passed on the basis of recognising that, historically, the education system 
provided to black persons – specifically from the region of Gaston County in North 
Carolina – had been grossly inferior to that of white persons.53 The original law 
instituting the literary tests as prerequisites to voting eligibility were found to 
disproportionately deny black persons the right to vote despite the law applying 
equally to all races. The law abolishing the tests was recognising indirect 
discrimination. However, the legislation provided for an appeal process that may be 
instituted by an effected State, were they to desire the re-establishment of the 
                                            
50 Gaston County, North Carolina v United States 395 U.S. 285 (1969). Hereafter referred to as 
‘Gaston County’. This case was relied upon in Griggs et al v Duke Power Co. 401 U.S. 424 (1971), 
which will be discussed in Chapter III below. 
51 Ibid at pp 286-287. 
52 Ibid. 





prerequisite literary tests.54 It is on this point of law that the Gaston County case 
came to be.  
 
Gaston County, North Carolina were challenging the suspension of the tests and 
wished to have the practice reinstated. The applicants had failed in previous courts 
as the judges were not satisfied that there was enough evidence to show that 
previously disadvantaged black persons would not be disproportionately denied the 
right to vote were the tests to be reinstated.55 Congress remarked (when suspending 
the use of tests) that if the testing was to be reinstituted for the reason proffered by 
the applicant – that the law no longer provides unequal education and it is necessary 
to have a certain level of literacy in voters – the consequences would be ironic. The 
law would have the effect of taking years of previous violation of equal education and 
use it as an excuse to violate the right to vote.56 The court accepted that 
acknowledgment of the social fact that there are still remains of a segregated school 
system, coupled with statistical evidence of white persons having higher literacy 
rates than black persons, was sufficient to prove that black persons would be unfairly 
disadvantaged by the use of literacy tests as a prerequisite to voting eligibility.57 The 
court believed these realities of the community meant that the equal application of 
literacy tests across races would unavoidably create discriminatory effect.  
 
The Gaston County case made an important point that even if it can be shown 
that great changes have been effected to ensure the new generations are not as 
disadvantaged, there are still generations living that have already become victims to 
discriminatory treatment and will not benefit in the same way, within their lifetime, to 
the positive measures implemented. Therefore, removing obstacles to promote the 
achievement of equality in the future does not eliminate the fact that inequality is still 
present today. Equally applying literacy tests to both races only brings the inequality 
to the surface – and especially exposes discrimination amongst the older 
generations.58  
 
                                            
54 Ibid at p 287. 
55 Ibid at pp 287-288. 
56 Ibid at p 289. 
57 Ibid at p 291. 





Gaston County does not make express mention of the concepts of indirect 
discrimination or disparate impact; however, these are clearly the ideas being 
discussed and enforced.59 South Africa is confronted on a daily basis with the 
realities of its deeply unequal economy across many categories of person.60 
Therefore, following in the thought process established in Gaston County, we can 
acknowledge the fact that it is simply true to say that a statistically significant number 
of black persons and women are remunerated at a lower level than white persons 
and men.61 We can explore statistics that reveal how far this truth penetrates into the 
economy. And finally, we can accept, as the court did in Gaston County, that the 
intention to correct the past, or even making progress to remedy previous 
disadvantage, does not detract from the social fact that, currently, “remuneration” 
exposes discrimination. 
 
CHAPTER III: DIFFERENTIATION ON THE GROUND OF REMUNERATION  
REQUIRES JUSTIFICATION 
 
Remuneration, as a means of differentiating between persons, may appear harmless 
and an example of neutrality.62 However, when the persons subjected to the 
application of that differentiation live within an economy where “the game is rigged”, 
a statistically significant number of women and black persons are never given the 
opportunity to “win” under a measure that rewards the higher earning.63 This chapter 
will explore how legal principles can demonstrate that using remuneration as a 
means to differentiate between persons (within the current economic status quo of 
South Africa) will always yield a finding of prima facie indirect unfair discrimination. 
As a result, this dissertation will conclude that remuneration cannot be used without 
justification. 
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(a) The Right to Equality and the Prohibition of Discrimination 
 
In a constitutional supremacy, like South Africa, the point of departure is the 
Constitution. The Constitution contains the right to equality in section 9 of its Bill of 
Rights. This right aims to prohibit the differential treatment of persons, in general. 
However, it specifically provides for a prohibition on the infringement of the right in 
the form of discrimination on various listed grounds (or an unlisted ground that can 
be proved to have similar adverse effect).64 These prohibited grounds include, 
amongst others, race and gender.65 
 
Since the enactment of the Constitution, the courts have interpreted the right to 
equality and given meaning to its text. Consequently, the courts have laid down the 
thresholds that must be overcome by each party in order to prove or disprove an 
infringement of the right to equality.66 Mere differentiation between persons is not 
prohibited by the Constitutional right, alone – the same goes for discrimination.67 The 
right to equality protects all persons by prohibiting unfair discrimination. Judicial 
interpretation has given content to the meaning of differentiation, discrimination, and 
unfair discrimination.68 The person claiming infringement of the right to equality in the 
form of unfair discrimination carries the burden of establishing a prima facie case.69 
Once this is achieved, a presumption of unfair discrimination arises.70 The burden 
then shifts to the defending party to justify the alleged conduct as not unfair.71  
 
Discrimination can take the form of either direct or indirect – both of which are 
prohibited by our Constitution.72 Specifically, section 9(3) of the Constitution provides 
that the state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on a 
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listed or analogous ground. Section 9(4) of the Constitution then extends this 
prohibition to ‘[n]o person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against 
anyone […]’ on the same grounds as above. Direct discrimination occurs when a 
particular provision of law or practice expressly differentiates on a listed ground in its 
text.73 The differentiation is in the wording of the provision itself and this need not be 
intentional.74 Indirect discrimination, on the other hand, is present when a provision 
or practice of law makes no express reference to particular groups of persons, but 
when the provision or practice is applied, the effect disadvantages a disproportionate 
number of one or more groups of persons.75 Therefore, proving indirect 
discrimination necessarily is accompanied by additional obstacles as evidence will 
need to be led to establish that differentiation exists in the impact of the challenged 
law. 
 
(b) Establishing Unfair Discrimination under South African Law 
 
This section will outline the current legal authorities that operate in our law when 
establishing the existence of unfair discrimination. Specifically, the standard of proof 
to be satisfied in order to substantiate a case of indirect unfair discrimination. 
 
(i) The Legal Test 
 
The decision in Harksen v Lane NO and Others76 laid the foundation for proving a 
prima facie case of unfair discrimination. The test consists of two steps. The first step 
is to establish differentiation between groups of persons. The differentiation must 
also have a rational connection to the legitimate government purpose sought by the 
relevant law.77 If there is no rational connection, the enquiry is complete and the 
differentiation is unconstitutional on the basis of irrationality.78 If there is a rational 
connection, there may still be unfair discrimination – thus, the test continues. The 
second step has two aspects. The first aspect involves showing that the 
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differentiation amounts to discrimination.79 Differentiation can amount to 
discrimination in two ways. If the differentiation is based on a ground listed in section 
9(3) of the Constitution or if it is based on an analogous ground.80 Essentially, 
differentiation becomes discrimination when the relevant ground that is the reason 
for the differential treatment has the ability to impair a person’s fundamental dignity.81 
The grounds listed in section 9(3) of the Constitution have been identified as always 
having the ability to impair a person’s fundamental dignity if used as a basis for 
treating people differently. An analogous ground would require evidence to support 
the claim that it has the same or similar effect on a person when used to treat him or 
her differently.82 Therefore, if a party alleging unfair discrimination can prove that the 
provision or practice of law differentiates on a ground listed in section 9(3) of the 
Constitution, the differentiation is presumed to be discrimination – while analogous 
grounds must be justified as stated above.83 The second aspect is to show that the 
discrimination amounts to unfair discrimination.84 The grounds listed in section 9(3) 
of the Constitution were selected not only because they always have the ability to 
impair a person’s fundamental dignity, but also because they are grounds that have 
been used historically to oppress and disadvantage persons.85  
 
 In summary, the Harksen test states that if discrimination is proved on a listed 
ground, unfairness will be presumed – it would then be for the defending party to 
justify the law or conduct.86  
 
 An analogous ground would introduce a separate evidentiary burden to show 
that the unlisted ground discriminates unfairly. Factors to be considered when 
determining the unfairness of the discrimination are: first, the position of the 
complainants in society and whether, as a group, they have been previously 
disadvantaged; second, the nature of the provision or power, and the purpose it 
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seeks to achieve; and third, the extent of the infringement on the rights of the 
complainant, and the degree of harm done to fundamental dignity.87  
 
 A conclusion that can be reached from the Harksen test is that if a person 
alleging unfair discrimination can discharge the burden of proving the presence of 
differentiation on a listed ground, unfairness and discrimination will be presumed. 
 
(ii) Differentiation in Indirect Discrimination 
 
Indirect discrimination carries an additional burden of proving that an express neutral 
differentiation causes a secondary discriminatory differentiation through its impact. 
South Africa’s approach to proving indirect discrimination is somewhat of a hybrid of 
various foreign jurisdictions. In this regard, Dupper explains the approaches that 
have been followed in the United States and the United Kingdom, and how we fall 
somewhere in between.88 
 
(aa) United States 
 
The case of Griggs et al v Duke Power Co.89 was the first of its kind in questioning 
an employment practice’s invalidity by virtue of its indirectly discriminating. The case 
involved an employment practice that required a high school education as a 
prerequisite for being appointed to certain departments of the company. There was a 
subsequent policy that was introduced alongside the high school education 
requirement, which required new applicants to achieve satisfactory results in aptitude 
tests that the company would administer. These were found to disproportionately 
prevent black persons from being recruited into all departments, except those that 
were historically allocated for black persons. Furthermore, the tests and high school 
education requirement were determined to have no bearing on an applicant’s ability 
to perform the work in question.90 The essential point in Griggs is that the 
requirements for job positions are permitted, and they may even cause disparate 
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impact on prohibited grounds, but only if it serves to fulfil an inherent requirement of 
the job. Therefore, the current position in the United States was created: policies 
causing disparate impact and acting to preserve a racially unequal economy are 
invalid if lacking a rational connection to job performance. In addition, this seminal 
case emphasised the need to look to the consequences of policies when dealing 
with indirect discrimination. 
 
Griggs was followed by a later Supreme Court case called Watson v Fort Worth 
Bank & Trust.91 This case involved a black employee at the respondent bank who 
applied for several promotions, but was unsuccessful for each one – being 
overlooked each time for a white applicant. There was no specific policy that created 
this result, but rather she claimed a trend in hiring that was causing disparate 
impact.92  
 
This case was pivotal in developing United States law regarding the evidentiary 
burden that must be overcome by a person alleging disparate impact. Watson 
introduced the necessity for the plaintiff in such a case to identify a specific policy 
that he or she is challenging.93 The case went on to state that once a policy has 
been identified, statistical evidence will need to be submitted to support the claim 
that the policy is causing a disparate impact on a particular group of persons.94 The 
court said that statistical evidence will assist the plaintiff in proving a prima facie 
case, but it is not taken as fact that the statistics and the correlation presented are 
true. The defending party is given the right of rebuttal and may present their own 
countering statistical evidence.95 Furthermore, the statistics should reveal a 
substantial disparate impact.96  
 
Lastly, the court confirmed the defence proposed in the Griggs case – that an 
employer is permitted to have a policy which causes disparate impact if the policy is 
necessary for the business.97 United States law requires a fairly heavy burden for the 
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plaintiff in a case of disparate impact. The plaintiff must clearly identify the offending 
policy, this in itself can be problematic in certain cases; they must then bring 
sophisticated statistical evidence that reveals an inequality in the workplace as well 
as society; and finally, the plaintiff will have to show sufficient correlation between 
the statistics and the policy to withstand the defending party’s rebuttal. 
 
(bb) United Kingdom  
 
The law in the United Kingdom prohibits a ‘requirement or condition’ that causes 
disparate impact.98 From an initial reading, these terms immediately appear more 
restrictive than the United States’ approach of prohibiting a discriminating ‘practice’. 
However, whether the terms’ effect would be narrow depended on how the courts 
would approach its interpretation. Unfortunately, the court in Perera v Civil Service 
Commission (No 2)99 took the narrowest of approaches. Dupper briefly outlines the 
facts of the case: the selection criteria for an available position that was advertised 
included that persons with a good command of the English language would receive 
preferential treatment - the applicant was of Sri Lankan dissent and felt that this 
criterion caused adverse effects on persons not originating from the United 
Kingdom.100 The court in Perera took the view that the criteria listed for the position 
were only preferences of the employers and that they did not amount to an absolute 
bar to being hired.101 The crux of the court’s opinion was that unless the plaintiff 
could show that the specific criterion of having a good command of the English 
language was the cause of disparate impact, there was no direct correlation. 
Therefore, the United Kingdom holds a very narrow view of what qualifies as 
disparate impact. 
 
When the circumstances are appropriate, and the plaintiff is able to show a 
‘requirement or condition’ as the cause of the disparate impact, the plaintiff then has 
to discharge an additional evidentiary burden. The plaintiff will have to show that the 
identified requirement or condition does, in fact, cause the alleged indirect 
discrimination. Dupper states that the United Kingdom has taken an opposing 
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approach to the United States regarding the evidentiary burden as well.102 The 
United Kingdom went so far as to display a hesitance to allowing statistical evidence 
as proof of disparate impact.103 The United Kingdom has rather taken a ‘common 
sense’ approach to determining indirect discrimination cases.104 The belief is that a 
case’s determination rests on acknowledging social facts which are general 
knowledge.105  
 
The case of Briggs v North Eastern Education & Library Board106 is an example 
of the common sense approach.107 In Briggs, the court relied on common sense in 
determining a requirement that teachers be responsible for extracurricular activities 
after the school day, was indirectly discriminatory against female teachers.108 This 
was due to the acknowledgment of the social fact that women are still the primary 
caregivers in families.109 Therefore, the law in the United Kingdom carries a much 
lower evidentiary burden for the plaintiff when showing that ‘requirements and 
conditions’ will cause disparate impact. The common sense approach requires the 
court to acknowledge social facts from its common knowledge. 
 
(cc)   South Africa 
 
As discussed above, our Constitution specifically prohibits the state and any 
individual from indirectly discriminating against anyone on one or more of the 
grounds listed in section 9(3), or an analogous ground.110 The Constitution does not 
specify what form the discrimination must take. Therefore, a statutory provision and 
a legal practice suffice to be identified as the items challenged for causing indirect 
discrimination. South Africa aims to make the task of the applicant to prove a prima 
facie case on a listed ground the least burdensome as possible.111  For this reason, 
our law has not opted to narrow the scope of what can be challenged as causing 
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indirect discrimination. Dupper argues that it is unlikely that the courts will ever adopt 
a very technical approach to this aspect of the applicant’s case.112 The first step of 
proving indirect discrimination is to identify, in a simple way, the aspects of law that 
are alleged to be causing discrimination and that will be the subject of the 
constitutional challenge. 
 
The issue arises as to the approach that South Africa has taken towards the 
extent of the evidentiary burden that must be satisfied. The South African courts 
appear to have taken an approach somewhere in between the United States and the 
United Kingdom.  
 
In the case of City Council of Pretoria v Walker,113 the court took an approach 
equivalent to the United Kingdom’s common sense approach. This case involved 
different areas of Pretoria being subjected to different methods of measuring water 
and electricity facility use.114 One area, which was historically inhabited by white 
persons, was charged a tariff based on actual consumption, as measured by a meter 
which each home had had installed by the municipality. The second area, which was 
historically composed of townships inhabited by black persons, was charged a flat 
rate (lower than the tariff) as meters had not yet been installed.115 The court 
accepted common knowledge of the social fact that the one area had historically 
been inhabited by white persons and the other had been inhabited by black persons. 
Therefore, the policy of the City Council indirectly differentiated on the ground of 
race.116 The court did not require any statistical evidence to support the 
representation of races in the different areas. A concern that arose amongst the 
judges of the court was that there were defendable reasons for why the City Council 
had instituted this policy. In addition, the policy was only an interim solution until the 
infrastructure could be distributed. However, Langa DP correctly stated that such 
concerns are to be raised when establishing the fairness of the discrimination, or in 
rebuttal to a prima facie case. The fact that there is unequal treatment, indirectly, 
between races is sufficient to show differentiation.117 
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South African law followed on from Walker by introducing a very basic use of 
statistics in the case of Leonard Dingler Employee Representative Council v Leonard 
Dingler (Pty) Ltd and Others.118 This case involved a company that differentiated 
between salary employees and wage employees by allowing both categories to one 
retirement benefit fund; then of the other two funds, one was for salary employees 
and the second was for wage employees. However, the salary employees were 
almost exclusively white persons and the wage employees were exclusively black 
persons.119 It is also important to note the benefits under these different funds were 
not identical. The court looked at the statistics of the representation of different races 
in different remuneration categories. The extent of the analysis was to reveal that 
weekly wage paid employees were entirely composed of black persons, while 50 of 
the monthly salary paid employees were white persons compared to only 8 black 
persons.120 The court was satisfied with these unsophisticated statistics. The 
conclusion was that to use the manner in which an employee was paid by this 
specific company as a differentiating factor, indirectly differentiates on the ground of 
race. 
 
 The aim of South Africa’s anti-discrimination legislation is to put as few obstacles 
as possible in the way of an applicant.121 Therefore, it is not difficult to understand 
why the approach of our courts has been to follow more closely on the side of the 
United Kingdom’s approach. And while it would seem very unlikely that South African 
courts would ever shift far on the spectrum towards the United States approach, it is 
likely to be common practice in proving indirect discrimination to rely on 
unsophisticated statistical evidence – to some degree. Thus, an applicant attempting 
to discharge the evidentiary burden in a claim of indirect discrimination would need 
to identify the aspect of law they believe to be discriminatory. Thereafter, an 
applicant must support such an allegation with common sense reasoning of social 
facts, and basic statistical support. 
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(c) The Unavoidable Existence of Prima Facie Unfair Discrimination 
 
This section will combine the two approaches of statistical evidence and common 
sense to reach the conclusion that differentiation on the ground of remuneration is 
prima facie unfairly discriminatory. This argument is strengthened by the result that if 
either approach were not favoured, both individual approaches sufficiently reach the 
abovementioned conclusion. 
 
(i) Statistical Evidence 
 
Various statistical evidence will be submitted in support of demonstrating that 
inequality exists in the workplace between men and women, and black persons and 
white persons. The comparison groups have been limited to just two of each for ease 
of discussion, it is not intended to suggest these are the only groups that yield 
statistically significant results of inequality. 
 
(aa)  Racial Inequality in the Workplace 
 
A statistic that should be noted at the beginning, in order to understand the degree of 
inequality, is that black persons constitute approximately 73 per cent of the 
employed population, and white persons are approximately 13 per cent of the 
employed population.122 The starting point will always be education when discussing 
the bottomline of why there is a difference in the jobs and remuneration available to 
different races. This dissertation will not attempt to offer an opinion on why the 
statistics around education reveal the inequality they do, the intention is to simply 
state the facts with which we are presently confronted. Therefore, concerning matric 
qualifications, approximately 54 per cent of the black population have less than a 
matric qualification; this is compared to approximately nine per cent of the white 
population.123 The opposite side of this is that approximately 16 per cent of the black 
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population have some form of tertiary education, but this pales in comparison to 
approximately 49 per cent of the white population holding tertiary qualifications.124 
Not having a matric qualification drastically hinders a person’s ability to find decent 
employment and employment with high earning potential.125 In addition, a tertiary 
education does not guarantee a higher remuneration; however, as a whole, persons 
with tertiary education do have the greatest earning potential in their lifetime.126 
Therefore, from these statistics alone, black persons are far more likely to earn lower 
remunerations than white persons.  
 
Moving on to the employment statistics, approximately 58 per cent of the 
employed white female population and 62 per cent of the employed white male 
population are employed in high skilled jobs.127 This is compared to approximately 
18 per cent of the employed black female population and 14 per cent of the 
employed black male population.128 A horrifying corresponding statistic to the above 
is that approximately only one per cent of the employed white female population and 
4 per cent of the employed white male population are employed in low skilled 
employment;129 this being when approximately 43 per cent of the employed black 
female population and 30 per cent of the employed black male population are 
employed in low skilled positions.130 These statistics show that white persons are 
exponentially more likely to be employed in higher skilled positions, while black 
persons are significantly more likely to be employed in lower skilled positions. 
Remuneration is not entirely connected to the skill level of the employment, but it is 
still very substantially connected.131 Essentially, the more easily an employee can be 
replaced, the lower the remuneration – this follows simple supply and demand 
economics. Therefore, it can again be concluded that black persons are more likely 
to earn lower remunerations than white persons.  
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Furthermore, a racialised unemployment rate also reveals that white persons are 
more likely to be employed than black persons – the white and black labour force 
unemployment rate is at approximately 6 per cent and 29 per cent, respectively.132  
 
A statistical report on the average income of households exposed that, in 2011, 
when a black person was the head of a household, that household’s average annual 
income was less than a fifth of the average household income in a household 
headed by a white person.133 This statistic is atrocious, but it should be noted that 
this is not, in itself, a clear representation of the inequality in remuneration across 
races, as it includes all forms of income from every member of a household.  
 
The final statistic is of the greatest concern to equality. Statistics show that 
average remuneration received by black males and females, in 2013, was less than 
one third of the average remuneration received by white males and females.134 
There are many possible mitigating factors for why such disparity exists. However, 
there comes a point where the justifications will run dry and a vast degree of the 
disparity will be unexplained by anything other than discrimination and inequality. 
 
Although there are many measures in place (statutory and societal) that are 
trying to remedy these disparities, the present truth cannot be escaped. The 
economic status quo of South Africa with which we are faced dictates: a statistically 
significant number of black persons will be disproportionately disadvantaged if the 
value of a person’s earnings is used as a measure of differentiation. 
 
(bb)  Gender Inequality in the Workplace 
 
All statistics referenced in this section derive from the August 2015 government 
report on the status of women in the South African economy.135 The statistics are, 
therefore, current, relevant and acknowledged by government. 
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An interesting initial statistic offered by the report comes from an engendered 
form of the gross national income per capita. This economic lens already 
demonstrates a disparity: the female value being R8 539, and the male share being 
R15 233.136 It should be noted that the nature of this statistic does not fully represent 
the so-called wage-gap, but it is certainly a telling inequality between genders.  
A statistical starting point that should be acknowledged to better assist 
understanding is that men make up approximately 54 per cent of the labour force 
and women make up 46 per cent.137 This is important because there are not as 
many women employed, or wanting to work, as men. Therefore, a formal concept of 
equality would not be on a 50/50 ratio, but rather a 54/46 ratio for men and women, 
respectively.  
 
First glance at the figures of female to male unemployed persons advances a 
perception of reasonable equality – the total number of men unemployed is relatively 
equal to the total number of women unemployed. However, in real terms, this is of 
concern. The concern arises due to the abovementioned statistic that the male 
labour force is considerably larger than the female labour force.138 Therefore, it can 
be concluded that there is a higher unemployment rate for women than for men.  
 
Another statistic, the first glance at which appears less alarming than it truly is, is 
the total number of men to women employed in low skilled jobs. The total number of 
men employed in low skilled jobs is only approximately 12 per cent less than the total 
number of women employed in low skilled jobs. Yet, again this must be viewed in 
light of the fact that the female labour force is notably smaller than the male labour 
force.139 As a result, the conclusion must be drawn that women are more likely to be 
employed in low skilled jobs than men. As mentioned above, it is trite that the lower 
the skill required for a job, the lower the wage.140  
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Further statistics show that men hold a little over 60 per cent of high skilled jobs. 
Within the category of high skilled jobs, women hold only approximately 31 per cent 
of managerial positions. The report goes on to expressly state its own conclusion 
from the statistics that women are more likely to be lower earners and engaged in 
lower paid work than men.141  
 
The South African government has calculated that the wage gap between men 
and women, in 2005, was that, on average, women earn 79 per cent of men’s 
average salaries.142 However, from my own calculations of the information provided 
earlier in the report: by 2013, women were earning, on average, 73 per cent of men’s 
average salaries.143 This is a disturbing result as it exposes the implication that the 
gap between a woman’s average salary and a man’s average salary has only 
widened, despite measures being put in place to advance women. The so-called 
wage-gap between men and women does vary between types of profession; 
however, it should be noted that in every category of occupations, women always 
earn less, on average, than men. The smallest earning differential is where women 
earn, on average, 93 per cent of men’s remuneration.144 That said, what is fairly 
detestable is that this disparity falls into the domestic work category of employment – 
a category that is almost entirely occupied by women and carries the patriarchal 
perception of being a “female job” – and yet, women earning less than men 
perseveres.145 The largest earning differential is so vast it leaves one pondering how 
it is tolerated. In the skilled agriculture and fishing category of employment, a woman 
will earn, on average, 21 per cent of a man’s average remuneration.146 Every lens 
through which this statistic could conceivably be viewed will be fruitless in attempting 
to explain away the existence of discrimination. 
 
A final indication of gender inequality in remuneration can be identified within tax 
records. From 2010 to 2013, despite the total number of male taxpayers decreasing 
and the total number of female taxpayers increasing, male taxable income increased 
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by more than female taxable income. Therefore, overall male income increased by 
more than overall female income in those given years – regardless of growth in 
female employment and recession in male employment. 
 
There are many avenues to pursue in the analysis of inequality, as is shown by 
the array of statistics, but it is overwhelmingly clear that a statistically significant 
number of women earn less than men in South Africa. 
 
(ii) The Common Sense Approach 
 
The common sense or common knowledge approach will be applied by means of 
acknowledgement of social facts concerning historical racial and gender inequality in 
South Africa, as well as the government’s use of implementing statutory measures to 
remedy inequality in race and gender. 
 
(aa)  Acknowledgement of Systemic Racial Inequality 
 
Racial inequality and its derivations in South Africa seem to most so obvious that 
they need no explanation. However, putting aside the deeply regrettable violent 
persecution and looking at the educational and economic oppression alone, we can 
begin to see why South Africa is still confronted with such entrenched racially-
defined poverty.147 In the words of Mokgoro J: “Apartheid […] deprive[d] the majority 
of the right to self actualisation and to control their own destinies.”148 This was the 
effect of the laws that governed the education and employment of black persons, 
and still is the case today.149  
 
Black persons are permitted to seek any employment they wish under South 
Africa’s new constitutional democracy – that is to say there are no longer laws 
preventing this. However, permission does not equate to ability. The two biggest 
obstacles black persons face today in finding more highly remunerated employment 
are lack of access to decent education and lack of experience.150 These obstacles 
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predominantly come from the poverty that so many black persons still endure.151 
Another reason that is so often overlooked is that the older generations cannot offer 
support for the younger generations in terms of education and higher skilled 
employment due to being previously oppressively denied opportunities.152 In the 
case of Brink v Kitshoff NO,153 O’Regan J briefly listed what Apartheid did to entire 
races of people.154 Amongst others, she lists that black persons were not allowed to 
own property, they were not allowed to live in areas allocated to white persons 
(which consisted of almost 90 per cent of land), they were not allowed access to 
senior jobs or established schools and universities or even libraries.155 Facilities 
inferior to all white facilities were provided to black persons. The inferior education 
system was not simply of lesser quality, but also deliberately denied black students 
various subjects, such as mathematics.156This was to ensure black persons were not 
equipped to pursue highly skilled jobs available – which were, in any event, reserved 
for the white population.157 Apartheid aimed to place the strongest of barriers in front 
of all black persons in order to ensure the advantage of the minority white 
population.158 What is so tragic for our nation is how notably successful these goals 
of Apartheid were – and, therefore, is why these barriers are still present even after 
the policies have been removed. 
 
Section 1 of the Constitution, expressly states that “non-racism and non-sexism” 
are founding values of the Republic of South Africa. This amounts to an 
acknowledgement that this was not necessarily the case previously, but will be the 
goal moving forward. The EEA provides a mandate for specific qualifying employers 
(designated employers) to implement affirmative action measures for designated 
groups.159 Black persons are defined as a designated group in s 1 of the EEA. This 
statutory acknowledgment of the inequality that exists between races reflects the 
commonly held belief of the country. The Broad-Based Black Economic 
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Empowerment Act160 is a further piece of legislation which offers evidence that the 
country believes races are so unequal that legislative measures are required to 
assist in remedying the problem. In addition, Mokgoro J, in the Minister of Finance 
and Others v Van Heerden161 judgment, states that during Apartheid the majority of 
wealth was systematically set aside for the minority white population – and Apartheid 
so deeply entrenched the disadvantage of black persons that the majority of the 
country’s wealth remains to this day in the hands of the minority.162 
 
The history of South Africa, read with the statements and measures initiated to 
undo the effects of racial inequality, serve as clear indications that the prevailing 
knowledge of the country favours an economic interpretation that black persons are 
not given the opportunity to earn on an equal level to white persons. 
 
(bb)  Acknowledgement of Systemic Gender Inequality 
 
The situation in South Africa concerning the discrimination of women is often 
somewhat overlooked or viewed as not critical. It is suggested that this is partly due 
to always living in the shadow of the overwhelming discrimination against black 
persons in South Africa.163 However, the lack of equality for women in many areas of 
life, but specifically the workplace, should not be ignored.164 
 
The core of the harm suffered by women appears to derive from the fact that we 
still live in a patriarchal society – where the ideal worker is perceived to be a male 
with no family responsibilities.165 This societal prejudice effects all types of women. 
Women that, nevertheless, fit comfortably within the ideal worker mould are still 
viewed under the prejudice when applying for a job. And, following this, women who 
do have family responsibilities are viewed as not being suitable for the workplace 
due to their need for flexibility.166 It is trite that, historically, women did not participate 
in traditional forms of work and were not well-educated. Perhaps since this era was 
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so long ago there is a perception that no evidence remains in the present economy. 
It may be true that we have come a very long way and the idea that a woman will not 
be educated or allowed to work seems archaic; however, the very definition of what 
is required of an employee was defined in those years when women did not work 
and only held family responsibilities.167 It is in that definition where South Africa has 
not changed. Therefore, when holding a woman up to the standard that has been 
entrenched in our understanding of what it means to hold a job, she faces obstacles 
that men do not face. Criteria for what is lauded as a “good worker”, such as 
seniority or hours worked, can prevent women from advancing in the workplace.168  
 
President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Hugo169 specifically 
states that women are still the primary care givers for their family, and these 
responsibilities are the main reason why women face obstacles in competing in the 
labour market.170 Due to a woman with family responsibilities’ inherent need for 
flexibility or wages that allow for alternative family care, women have tended to be 
located in the self-employment or informal sectors.171 Another issue faced by women 
is that certain jobs are perceived to be “female jobs” or “male jobs”.172 Female jobs 
are generally those that include caring for people. These jobs are then viewed as 
simply an extension of what women ordinarily do and are, therefore, not valued 
highly in terms of wages.173 The reason that some women are not getting the 
necessary education to pursue traditional and higher paid work also is substantially 
linked to family responsibilities.174 Statistics show that in the age range of 14 years to 
18 years, 16.5 per cent of surveyed female students reported not attending school 
because they were needed by their family – this compared to 1.1 per cent of males 
of the same age.175 Furthermore, 11.7 per cent of females of the age range 19 years 
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to 24 years reported the same reason for not attending school – compared to 0.5 per 
cent of males of the same age.176  
 
This results in the same conclusion. Substantial volumes of the hardship faced 
by women in the workplace derives from a patriarchal idea of an employee that has 
not been developed. 
 
In addition, as mentioned above, “non-sexism” is a founding value of the 
Constitution.177 This, again, expresses an acknowledgement that non-sexism was 
not necessarily a commitment by the country, previously, but shall be pursued in the 
future. Furthermore, the EEA obligates qualifying employers to institute affirmative 
action measures for designated groups, and section 1 of the EEA defines women to 
be a designated group. This can be interpreted as an acknowledgment, by the 
legislature, that women are not on equal footing in the workplace. The overwhelming 
consensus dictates that gender remuneration inequality has long been 
acknowledged by South Africa. 
 
At the conclusion of this discussion, remuneration may still carry an appearance 
of neutrality. It is difficult to equate remuneration as a standard or measure 
necessarily disproportionately disadvantaging women and black persons. Perhaps it 
is because a person’s finances seem like they will always be relevant – so the 
distinction is necessary. However, the point is that, unless a person’s earning level is 
directly relevant and necessary, using remuneration will always create differentiation 
between races and genders. 
 
Differentiation on the ground of remuneration inextricably gives rise to 
differentiation on the grounds of race and gender. Therefore, differentiation on the 
listed grounds of race and gender is established. The Harksen test dictates that 
unfair discrimination and inconsistency with the Constitution is now presumed and 
requires justification. Below, in Chapter IV and V, this dissertation will take the 
principles established above and apply them to the interpretations and text of a 
specific provision: s 194 of the LRA. 
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CHAPTER IV: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF QUANTIFYING COMPENSATION 
IN TERMS OF REMUNERATION 
 
This section will seek to expand on the characteristics of the various approaches the 
courts have taken in interpreting how compensation should be quantified in 
employment disputes. As mentioned above, s 194 of the LRA only calls for 
compensation that is ‘just and equitable’; yet, it would seem that the courts have 
taken it upon themselves to interpret this requirement in manners likely never 
intended by the legislation. Applying the principles established in Chapter III, the 
conclusion that will be reached is that any interpretation on the part of the courts that 
imposes a measure in terms of remuneration on the meaning of “just and equitable’ 
is unconstitutional. 
 
(a) The Two Interpretations 
 
(i) The Loss-Based Approach178 
 
One of the first cases to interpret s 194 of the LRA as intending the loss-based 
approach was Harmsen v Alstom Electrical Machines (Pty) Ltd.179 This case involved 
the retrenchment of an employee. However, correct procedure was not followed by 
the employer and the employer did not offer sufficient evidence that the 
retrenchment was fair.180 The applicant did not seek to be reinstated; therefore, the 
court began assessment of what compensation should be ordered. The judge in 
Harmsen initiated the evaluation by stating that the applicant had found subsequent 
employment immediately, but at a lower rate of remuneration.181 This was taken to 
be a mitigating factor of the total harm suffered by the applicant. The court described 
statutory compensation as a discretionary remedy that was simply limited in the 
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quantum that may be awarded.182 This statement supports the description of the 
loss-based approach where the award is determined independently, and thereafter 
the limitation is applied if necessary.  
 
The judge in Harmsen determined the meaning of “just and equitable” to both 
parties to mean that the maximum an applicant should receive is the total loss 
suffered (which is ordinarily in the form of lost remuneration). However, the fairness 
of the context and the mitigating factors will determine whether the applicant can 
recover the full loss.183 Utilising this reasoning, the court ruled that the appropriate 
compensation would be the difference between the annual remuneration the 
applicant received at his previous job and the lesser annual remuneration he 
received at the position he was forced to take after being retrenched.184 This is a 
very strict version of the loss-based approach as loss is almost exclusively assumed 
to be remuneration. This point of departure for the loss-based approach is 
understandable as it is one of the first cases to develop the interpretation. 
 
Harmsen’s very strict approach to the loss-based approach as well as what 
constitutes loss did not lend itself to being very helpful when a matter concerning an 
unfair labour practice came before the court – this is because without a dismissal, no 
remuneration was lost. Therefore, the loss-based approach was further developed 
by Davis JA in the Labour Appeal Court judgment of Minister for Justice and 
Constitutional Development and Another v Tshishonga185 to be more inclusive of 
what can constitute loss. Tshishonga (LAC) involved an employee that made a 
protected disclosure and was subsequently subjected to occupational detriment for 
said disclosure. The employee was suspended and had a disciplinary enquiry 
instituted against him.186 Section 186(2)(d) of the LRA describes an unfair labour 
practice to be an occupational detriment, other than dismissal, in contravention of the 
Protected Disclosures Act,187 and due to the employee making a protected 
disclosure as defined in the PDA. The court found that the alleged protected 
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disclosure and occupational detriment satisfied the ambit of the PDA; therefore, the 
conduct of the employer qualified as an unfair labour practice.188  
 
Davis JA then continued to assess the appropriate remedy. The court lists a 
great deal of factors that could be taken into account to determine the appropriate 
remedy in this case; these ranged from the general ill treatment of the employee to 
the fact that he required the services of a trauma counsellor, and the extent of legal 
fees he incurred in the various processes.189 Davis JA states that compensation 
under the LRA must encompass patrimonial as well as non-patrimonial loss. In 
addition, the statutory limitations placed on compensation in s 194 of the LRA only 
act to cap the total sum, not to assist in the measurement of the value.190 Therefore, 
in this interpretation, the starting point of compensation quantification is the 
patrimonial loss suffered by the employee.191 Davis JA then develops the loss-based 
approach by stating that the non-patrimonial loss assessment must be likened to that 
of a delictual claim for actio injuriarum.192 Possible factors to consider when 
assessing non-patrimonial loss are: nature and seriousness of the iniuria, the 
circumstances of the harm, the behaviour or intention of the employer, the degree of 
emotional distress suffered, any exploitation or abuse of the relationship of the 
parties, and the employer’s attitude subsequent to the transgression.193 Davis JA 
continued by taking all relevant factors into account and determined that the 
considerable harm caused and behaviour of the employer warranted a substantial 
quantification of non-patrimonial loss. Davis JA awarded the employee the full value 
of patrimonial loss (R177 000) as well as R100 000 in non-patrimonial loss.194 
 
The loss-based approach currently takes the form of viewing compensation that 
is ‘just and equitable, to encompass patrimonial and non-patrimonial loss. 
Patrimonial loss will form the initial inquiry, and non-patrimonial loss will be evaluated 
as an iniuria. Section 194 of the LRA will only serve a purpose if the total sum of 
what is ‘just and equitable’ exceeds the equivalent of 12 or 24 months’ worth of the 
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employee’s remuneration – depending on the case. Therefore, it can be seen that 
the loss-based approach makes no attempt to quantify compensation solely in terms 
of remuneration. Consequently, while this dissertation will conclude that the loss-
based approach is not unconstitutional, the approach remains inconsistent with the 
intentions of the LRA. This will be discussed further in Chapter VI. 
 
 
(ii) The ‘Sui Generis’ Approach195 
 
This approach centres around the measure of unfairness. However, the trend that 
has emerged in cases that adopt the Sui Generis approach is to offer very little 
explanation or reasoning for the determination of the value of compensation 
awarded. The most common method of reasoning is to engage briefly with an 
assessment of how unfair all of the relevant circumstances were and follow it with a 
number between 1 to 12 (for ordinary dismissals and unfair labour practices) or 1 to 
24 (for automatically unfair dismissals). This unfortunate tendency of the courts 
makes it difficult to predict outcomes of future or potential claims.  
 
The case of Cosme v Polisak (Pty) Ltd196 is an example of this abovementioned 
trend. This case involved an employee that was verbally abused by a manager, and 
made the decision to report the incident and demand an apology. Following this, the 
employer launched a process to have the employee’s employment contract 
terminated due to his having reached the age of retirement.197 However, there was 
no evidence of any such policy that employees must retire at the age of 65, nor was 
there any contractual term to that effect.198 The termination of the employment 
contract was determined to constitute an automatically unfair dismissal.199 The full 
extent of the reasoning offered by the judge in determining the award of 
compensation was: 
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“Having arrived at the conclusion that the dismissal of the employee was 
automatically unfair I see no reason in the circumstances of this case why he 
should not be awarded the maximum compensation as provided for in section 
194(3) of the LRA.”200 
 
The judge awarded the employee the equivalent of 24 months’ remuneration, but 
did not offer an explanation as to why the maximum compensation permitted was 
ordered. There were also no reasons put forward as to how the court evaluated the 
fairness of the circumstances. 
 
The above case was also an example of the effect that the Sui Generis 
approach has on quantifying compensation; that is, to quantify in terms of months of 
remuneration. A case that demonstrates this aspect of the Sui Generis approach is 
the Labour Court judgment of Nape v INTCS Corporate Solutions (Pty) Ltd.201 This 
case involved an employee of a labour broker working on the premises of a third 
party.202 The employee committed an act of minor misconduct which took the form 
of sending an offensive email.203 The third party no longer wanted the employee on 
their premises and demanded from the labour broker that the employee be 
removed.204 The labour broker suspended the employee and initiated a disciplinary 
enquiry where it was determined that a final warning would be sufficient.205 
However, the third party refused to permit the employee to return to its premises.206 
The labour broker was unable to place the employee in another position and, 
thereafter, began procedures to retrench him.207  
 
The employee suffered no financial loss as he immediately found new 
employment at an increased salary level; however, he still brought a claim as he 
believed that his dismissal was substantively and procedurally unfair.208 The court 
determined that the dismissal was substantively unfair, but due to many mitigating 
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factors, the dismissal was rendered probably as fair as an unfair dismissal could be. 
The equivalent of one month’s remuneration was awarded.209 Therefore, the judge 
chose to quantify the compensation in terms of the employee’s remuneration 
instead of conducting an enquiry into what is ‘just and equitable’ for the infringement 
of the right to fair labour practices.  
 
This case implies a concerning interpretation of s 194 of the LRA. Even if the 
following conditions are present: there has been little to no suffering by either party, 
both parties were guilty of some degree of wrongdoing, and the employee is in a 
better financial position after the dismissal, an employer is still ordered to pay. If the 
court wishes to make an award because the dismissal was indeed unlawful, the 
minimum award available is the equivalent to one month’s remuneration of the 
employee because compensation is measured in terms of months of remuneration. 
Therefore, if an employee is in a highly paid position, the award ordered could be 
very generous despite the relative fairness of the circumstances.  
 
The sui generis approach can have the result of quantifying compensation by 
rating the unfairness on a sliding scale of 1 to 12 or 1 to 24 – thereby, valuing the 
employee’s harm in terms of what he earns. There will be judges and 
commissioners that will not strictly adhere to a measurement of a ‘month’. Awards 
of several weeks will likely be awarded in certain cases. However, the defining 
aspect of this approach is the employee having his or her harm suffered measured 
in terms of his or her earning ability. 
 
(b) The Extent of the Unconstitutionality 
 
This dissertation will make recommendations in chapter VI about a proposed 
approach to quantifying compensation that is more in line with the purposes of the 
LRA and the Constitution. However, as far as the unconstitutionality of using 
remuneration in the measure of compensation quantification is concerned, the Loss-
based approach is not of concern. What is of concern is the Sui Generis approach. 
                                            





This approach directly makes use of an employee’s earnings to quantify “just and 
equitable” compensation when he or she has been wronged by his or her employer.  
 
 The cases discussed in chapter II exposed how harmful remuneration, as a 
measure, can be when employees suffer similar harm, but are awarded drastically 
different sums due to their remuneration rate. Furthermore, chapter III clearly 
demonstrates the unconstitutional nature of utilising remuneration to differentiate 
between persons. Remuneration is inextricably linked to the discrimination of race 
and gender, and must be justified to be used lawfully. The Constitution dictates that 
when legislation is interpreted, the interpretation that gives the greatest effect to the 
Constitution and its Bill of Rights must be preferred.210 This dissertation will elaborate 
in chapter VI as to the reason why the Loss-based approach is not the most legally 
correct. However, for the sake of proving the Sui Generis approach’s 
unconstitutionality, it is submitted that there already exists an interpretation that 
better upholds the Constitution: the Loss-based approach. For these reasons, to the 
extent that ‘just and equitable’ compensation is interpreted to require a sliding scale 
measurement in terms of an employee’s remuneration, it is unconstitutional and 
invalid. Therefore, the Sui Generis approach cannot be justified under the 
Constitution. 
 
CHAPTER V: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LIMITING COMPENSATION IN 
TERMS OF REMUNERATION 
 
This section seeks to demonstrate that the text of s 194 of the LRA is 
unconstitutional as far as it limits compensation awards to the equivalent of 12 or 24 
months’ remuneration (depending on the claim). Therefore, s 194 of the LRA will be 
found to be in violation of the Constitution, but as it is a law of general application, it 
receives an additional chance to be justified through a limitations analysis.211 
However, the analysis will conclude that the use of remuneration in limiting 
compensation awards cannot pass constitutional muster. 
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(a) The Limitation under Section 194 of the LRA 
 
This chapter deals intensively with s 194 of the LRA; therefore, it serves to 
reproduce the provision: 
 
194 Limits on Compensation 
(1) The compensation awarded to an employee whose dismissal is found to be 
unfair because the employer did not prove that the reason for dismissal was a fair 
reason relating to the employee’s conduct or capacity or the employer’s 
operational requirements or the employer did not follow a fair procedure, or both, 
must be just and equitable in all the circumstances, but may not be more than the 
equivalent of 12 months’ remuneration calculated at the employee’s rate of 
remuneration on the date of dismissal. 
(2) … 
(3) The compensation awarded to an employee whose dismissal is automatically 
unfair must be just and equitable in all the circumstances, but not more than the 
equivalent of 24 months’ remuneration calculated at the employee’s rate of 
remuneration on the date of dismissal. 
(4) The compensation awarded to an employee in respect of an unfair labour 
practice must be just and equitable in all the circumstances, but not more than 
the equivalent of 12 months’ remuneration. 
 
As discussed in the above section, the courts have offered interpretation of 
section 194 of the LRA and developed methods of approaching the quantification of 
compensation awarded to successful employees. However, the second problematic 
aspect of s 194 of the LRA is the text itself. The provision stipulates that 
compensation will be limited to the equivalent of 12 or 24 months’ remuneration. In 
this respect s 194 of the LRA directly utilises remuneration as a means of 
differentiating between persons. 
 
(b) The Extent of the Unconstitutionality 
 
The cases discussed in Chapter II revealed that the limitations can have severe 
repercussions even in cases where the maximum is not awarded. This is seen where 
employees such as those in Masondo and Mnomiya are limited in their total claim by 
less than the employees in Hibbert and Solidarity obo de Vries would receive for one 
month. This is the reality created by the form of the limitation. 
 
 Applying the legal principles established in chapter III to s 194 of the LRA: to the 





unconstitutional unless justified. Section 194 of the LRA utilises remuneration 
specifically to measure the limit that will be placed on any individual entering a labour 
dispute forum. Differentiation on the ground of remuneration necessarily triggers a 
secondary differentiation on the grounds of race and gender. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that the limitation itself is not unconstitutional, it is rather the form which 
the limitation takes that is prima facie unconstitutional. 
 
(c) Using Remuneration to Limit Compensation Cannot Withstand a 
‘Limitations Analysis’ 
 
When prima facie unfair discrimination is identified on a listed ground, the right to 
equality is being infringed. In this regard, if a law of general application is being 
challenged as the cause for the infringement, a ‘section 36 limitations analysis’ must 
be completed to establish whether the limitation is justified. All rights can be limited; 
however, to what degree, depends on the right and the circumstances in each 
individual case. 
 
(i) The Legal Position 
 
Section 36 of the Constitution states that only a law of general application may limit a 
right in the Bill of Rights.212 Therefore, it must first be established that what is being 
challenged is considered a law of general application. This concept is not too 
complex. It is suggested that the challenged law must only be accessible, precise, 
and apply to the population generally.213 If the law is found to not be of general 
application, no further enquiry is required as the right limitation cannot be justified. If 
the law is of general application, the enquiry moves forward. Ultimately, the analysis 
aims to assess whether such a limitation can be justified given the fundamental 
principles of our Constitution and our country.214 In determining this objective, 
section 36 offers several factors that must be considered – however, it is not a 
closed list.  
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The first factor to consider is the nature of the right that is limited.215 Case law 
has suggested that this factor includes the importance of the right, but it has been 
argued that this is not necessarily a consideration that must be included.216 At the 
very least, the nature of the right includes an enquiry into the extent of the right’s 
ability to be limited.217 The nature of a right also includes its permeability, in that 
rights may derive from or overlap with others.218 Therefore, it may be necessary to 
analyse other rights. If the additional right cannot be limited in the given 
circumstances, then the original right being limited can only be limited in so far as it 
does not encroach on the additional right.  
 
The second factor to consider is the importance of the purpose of the 
limitation.219 This factor recognises that for a limitation to be justified, the limitation 
must fulfil a substantial state interest.220 It also recognises that there will be 
circumstances where a purpose behind a limitation is more important than the 
specific infringement it creates.  
 
The third factor is the nature and extent of the limitation.221 This includes the 
manner in which the limitation actually limits the right and to what degree the 
limitation limits the right.222  
 
The fourth factor is the relation between the limitation and its purpose.223 
Essentially, this factor introduces a rationality test into the limitations analysis.224 This 
factor also creates a threshold standard that there must be a rational connection 
between the limitation and its purpose for the enquiry to continue.225 Consequently, it 
is submitted that a limitation on a right can never be justified if it is irrational.  
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The final factor for consideration is whether less restrictive means are available 
to achieve the same purpose.226 This factor requires the person assessing the 
enquiry to step into the shoes of the legislature and explore possible policy 
alternatives.227 It should be noted that this does not necessarily call for the assessor 
of the limitations analysis to substitute a policy he or she deems less infringing than 
the current policy under challenge. Rather, what is important is simply to determine 
that the current policy is not satisfactory by engaging with policy alternatives. If the 
policy were to be declared unconstitutional, as the limitation is not justified, only then 
is an independent enquiry is conducted into what should be done to remedy the 
circumstances.  
 
It is important to note is that the factors are each one of many and not 
necessarily determinative of anything in and of itself.228 All factors must be weighed 
along with any other relevant factor in the circumstances to come to a conclusion 
whether the right in question is justifiably limited given the foundational principles of 
the Constitution. 
 
(ii) Evaluating the Infringement of the Right to Equality 
 
The LRA is an easily accessible public document and, as a whole, applies to all 
employees generally. In addition, s 194 of the LRA is precise in conferring the 
limitations on compensation awards. As a provision within a public statute, s 194 can 
easily be said to be a law of general application. Therefore, a limitations analysis will 
be necessary. 
 
The first factor is the nature of the right that is limited. The right that is limited is 
the right to equality. Given the history of our country, this right is utterly fundamental 
to be upheld as far as is possible.229 However, the law does recognise the right’s 
ability to be limited. For example, in the Masondo case, the commissioner stated that 
the unfair discrimination on the ground of family responsibility may have been 
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defendable if it was done out of business necessity.230 It is fair to say that the right to 
equality may be limited in certain circumstances, but given the right’s link to the 
fundamental principles of the Constitution, infringements should be rare and shallow. 
The right to equality also significantly overlaps with the right to dignity.231 This is 
portrayed in the definition of what it means to discriminate – which is to infringe the 
right to equality by treating persons unequally based on a characteristic that has the 
ability to impair their fundamental dignity.232 Therefore, the infringement of the right 
to equality that is discussed in this dissertation is precisely where the rights interlink. 
It would appear that this factor would count against the justifiability of the right’s 
limitation unless governmental necessity were found.  
 
The second factor to consider is the importance and purpose of the limitation. 
The purpose of s 194 of the LRA was articulated in the case of Kroukam v SA Airlink 
(Pty) Ltd.233 The court stated that the purpose of the limitations to the compensation 
awards available is to limit the financial risk of the employer in an unfair dismissal or 
unfair labour practice claim.234 The implementing of a limit was also a necessary tool 
of the negotiations surrounding the drafting of the LRA.235 The employee 
representatives agreed to have a limitation on employers’ liability if reinstatement 
would be the primary remedy in unfair dismissal cases.236 It should be noted, the 
limitation of liability was the purpose of s 194 of the LRA – this did not mandate the 
limitation taking the form of being measured in terms of remuneration. It is the 
measurement in terms of remuneration that limits the right to equality, not the actual 
limiting of compensation. However, the current form of the provision does serve the 
important purpose of maintaining the agreement struck in negotiations. This is a 
persuasive factor in favour of the limitation’s justification.  
 
The third factor is the nature and extent of the limitation. The manner in which 
the limitation actually limits is concerning. Remuneration indirectly discriminates 
against black persons and women by disproportionately advantaging the previously 
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advantaged. In amplification, this is occurring when women and black persons are 
mistreated by their employers, and wish to be compensated for such harm. This is a 
perpetuation of South Africa’s biggest systemic problem. Racial and gender 
inequality is a reality in South Africa, and this form of limitation of the right to equality 
only serves to aggravate those inequalities. This is in violation of the fundamental 
principles of the Constitution and this factor strongly acts against the justification of 
the limitation.  
 
The fourth factor to consider requires assessing a rational connection between 
the limitation and its purpose. The limitation served to fulfil the agreement negotiated 
in the drafting of the LRA regarding the limiting of the liability of employers should 
compensation be awarded. This purpose is achieved. The rationality of the limitation 
is in favour of justification.  
 
The final factor considers whether there are less restrictive means to achieve the 
purpose. This dissertation will fully engage with suitable alternatives when 
recommendations are made in Chapter VI; however, this factor can be analysed by 
assessing if there could be any alternative at all. It is important to begin by noting 
that the current limitation to the right to equality is not always a particularly effective 
way to achieve the purpose. Making use of an employee’s remuneration to measure 
the limitation on compensation can dictate potentially excessive awards for highly 
paid employees. An employee such as the one discussed in the Solidarity obo de 
Vries case earned R46 000 per month. In his case he would have been limited by 
the equivalent of 12 months’ remuneration which equates to R552 000 – R552 000 is 
not a great limitation on the financial risk to an employer for an ordinary unfair 
dismissal. However, it is perhaps too effective in the case of low paid employees. 
The employee in the case of Mnomiya was limited to the equivalent of 24 months’ 
remuneration as her case involved unfair discrimination which equates to R15 890 – 
R15 890 would be unlikely to act as a deterrent to a private individual, let alone a 
large corporation.  
 
The measurement of the limitation to compensation being in terms of 
remuneration was simply instituted to fulfil the purpose of limiting the financial risk of 





necessarily require including remuneration as the measure. Setting a monetary limit 
on the various compensations would achieve the same purpose without limiting the 
right to equality.237 Therefore, the final factor adds great weight to the 
unreasonableness of the limitation to the right to equality. 
 
Weighing all of the various factors discussed on a balance of probabilities, there 
appears to be less evidence in support of the limitation to the right to equality. It is 
safe to conclude that the limitation to the right to equality cannot be justified given 
the fundamental principles of our Constitution. The form that the limitation takes in s 
194 of the LRA is unconstitutional. 
 
CHAPTER VI: RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
It has been established in the above Chapters IV and V that the current interpretation 
and version of s 194 of the LRA are unconstitutional. However, this argument is 
strengthened when it is shown that there are achievable alternatives to our current 
position. Possible constitutionally valid solutions will be explored below. A new 
interpretation of s 194 of the LRA will be proposed in the hope that it will be adopted 
in practice. Regarding the variations to the form of the limitation that will be 
recommended, this dissertation seeks to implore upon the legislature to amend all 
text which further entrenches South Africa’s systemic inequality.  
 
(a) A New Constitutionally-Sound Interpretation 
 
As mentioned in Chapter I, the text of s 194 of the LRA only mandates that 
compensation be “just and equitable”. It is admitted that this does not provide a 
defined path for judges and commissioners to follow in their quantification of an 
award. However, as established in Chapter IV, to the extent that “just and equitable” 
is interpreted to intend the ‘Sui Generis’ approach, the interpretation is 
unconstitutional. The provision must be given an interpretation that the text is 
capable of intending and that is not inconsistent with the Constitution. The 
interpretation of any legislation must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill 
                                            





of Rights.238 It is trite that the Bill of Rights cannot be promoted when the 
interpretation of the legislation is the cause of the infringement to the Bill of Rights. 
The inconsistency with the Constitution only arises from the use of remuneration as 
the measure for quantification of compensation. This measure of relying on a 
person’s earning ability was established in Chapter III to be problematic in the 
economic status quo of South Africa. Davis JA, in Tshishonga, correctly found that  
s 194 of the LRA is capable of an interpretation that gives no regard to remuneration 
unless the limitation on the award becomes relevant.239 Therefore, what is the 
solution? 
 
This dissertation will not be proposing the use of the Loss-based approach. It is 
submitted that this approach is not correct by default, simply because it is the only 
practiced alternative. The Loss-based approach is a relaxed adaption of delictual law 
that could not have been intended for the purposes of the LRA. The LRA was 
designed with the goal in mind of creating faster resolution of labour disputes.240 A 
strict adhesion to the concepts of patrimonial and non-patrimonial loss is not in 
keeping with the idea of not requiring sophisticated evidence from employees.241 In 
addition, the delictual ethos of a heavy focus on the restitution of every cent of loss 
that can be proved is contrary to the concept of compensation.242 Compensation and 
damages are often used in speech synonymously; however, their technical 
meanings are in no way synonymous.243 
 
The interpretation that this dissertation will propose is an expansion of an 
interpretation by Rochelle Le Roux, in her article discussing issues within 
employment law remedies.244 The key aspect of the new interpretation is that 
remuneration should play no role in the quantification of compensation.245 Second, 
compensation must not be viewed in the way envisioned in delictual or contractual 
law where the objective is to restore the wronged party, as far as possible, to the 
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position he or she was in before the harm occurred. Instead, compensation should 
be viewed as remedying the infringement of a constitutional and statutory 
employment right.246 Compensation is not delictual or contractual damages, where 
the aim is more to reimburse for full proven loss. The crux of a delictual or 
contractual claim is harm of person or breach of contract. Whereas, labour law 
compensation vindicates a constitutional and statutory right by considering all 
relevant factors involved in the infringement – it is in no way a guarantee of 
recovering loss suffered as a result of the infringement.247  
 
The point of departure for the assessment of compensation should not be 
patrimonial loss or fairness, but rather it should be what is “just and equitable” in the 
circumstances. ‘Just and equitable’ is the full extent of the mandate under s 194 of 
the LRA concerning quantification. Compensation should not be an award 
specifically for patrimonial loss, non-patrimonial loss, or even fairness – these factors 
are merely relevant in the consideration of what is ‘just and equitable’ in the 
circumstances of the right infringement.248 This assessment will require a balancing 
act of the fairness of the infringement, the loss the employee was forced to suffer, 
but also the employer involved and his or her concerns.249 Compensation should 
never intend to punish the employer, but his conduct will influence the fairness of the 
circumstances of what is ‘just and equitable’.250 Assessing compensation should 
uphold the established purpose of the LRA in creating an environment where 
disputes can be resolved quickly and the employee is not required to present 
complex evidence. Le Roux proposes, that the most important factor is that the 
employee can establish that loss was suffered, not the full extent of the loss.251 
 
The defining characteristic of this approach is to weigh all relevant factors in 
compensating an employee for the violation of their right to fair labour practices. This 
approach is a compromise approach as it draws on aspects of both established 
interpretations. The compromise approach takes from the loss-based approach its 
view to have no regard to remuneration in its compensation quantification, as well as 











its consideration of all forms of loss. From the sui generis approach, the compromise 
approach takes the emphasis on assessing fairness. However, the compromise 
approach is the only approach which gives consideration to the purposes of the 
legislation from which it derives. This compromise approach is, in the opinion of this 
dissertation, the most correct under current labour law and our Constitution. 
 
The practical application of the compromise approach to the quantification of 
compensation would be achievable. The remuneration earned by each employee 
bringing a claim would still be very relevant to the assessment of the award. 
Currently, there are many factors that are considered to evaluate the fairness of the 
infringement, but this fairness is then rated on a scale of months of remuneration. 
Employees are having the infringement to their right to fair labour practices 
measured in terms of what they are capable of earning – no regard is given to 
whether an employee was systemically denied opportunities to earn even a liveable 
wage.  
 
Going forward, remuneration should only be considered when assessing 
remuneration loss (only one form of loss an employee may suffer). It is admitted that 
remuneration loss will be a sizeable factor in any case of dismissal and some unfair 
labour practices. For this reason, high earning employees, such as the white men 
discussed in the cases of Hibbert and Solidarity obo de Vries, will likely always be 
awarded far larger sums than low earners, such as the black women discussed in 
Masondo and Mnomiya. However, under the compromise approach, the high earning 
employees may be awarded less and the low earning employees may be awarded 
more – relative to the current state of affairs.  
 
Compensation under s 194 of the LRA is not intended to restore all lost 
remuneration, and the legislation’s true intentions will be perpetuated under the 
compromise approach. With the focus shifted to the extent that the right to fair labour 
practices has been infringed (and the compensation being just and equitable in the 
circumstances), high earning employees will not benefit as much as they have been 
by virtue of their capability to earn. Complementing this, low earning employees will 
not be as disadvantaged by virtue of the systemic obstacles determining their low 





by the change. Higher paid employees will likely recover a small portion less 
compensation and lower paid employees will likely recover a small portion more 
compensation – a balance is struck. The balance has the effect of ensuring that the 
value any given employer would expect to pay in a specified period would vary 
negligibly. 
 
(b) Alternative Limitation Solutions from Foreign Jurisdictions 
 
It is important when developing the law to give consideration to foreign jurisdictions 
that are relevant to South African law. This is true whether it is because they are 
similar in nature or South African law partially derived its current form from the other 
jurisdiction. However, it should be acknowledged from the start that South African 
labour law will always be markedly different from foreign jurisdictions as we are one 
of the only countries to have a constitutional right to fair labour practices in addition 
to a constitutional supremacy.252 This section will attempt to ascertain the manner in 
which foreign jurisdictions limit compensation in employment claims, in the hope that 
such foreign insights will be viable for adoption into our law. 
 
(i) United States 
 
The United States of America has a notably different labour law system to South 
Africa. South African laws offer greater protection to the employee. For example, the 
United States has a form of employment termed “at will” employment.253 This form of 
employment permits the dismissal of any employee for any reason – the employer 
need only not make the decision on illegal grounds. However, this foreign jurisdiction 
is always beneficial to compare with our own law given their constitutional 
supremacy.254 The challenge with which this dissertation engages is one of 
constitutional relevance and, therefore, the United States is an important jurisdiction 
to consider. 
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The labour law of the United States does not derive from a single document or 
even a few based on the protection they provide. Rather there is approximately a 
statute for every category of person the law seeks to protect. However, these are 
mostly compiled into a single federal document called the United States Code. This 
dissertation will only be referring to the majority of the federal statutes that regulate 
labour law – this dissertation will not engage with state legislation. This is due to the 
nature of the law in the United States: labour laws will differ between states as the 
states can expand on federal law, but federal legislation shows the minimum laws 
applicable to the entire country.255 
 
The first two statutes this dissertation will discuss are the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967 and the Civil Rights Act of 1964.256 The ADEA and CRA 
both provide for unlimited awards to employees, but introduce an interesting 
distinction that differentiates between intentional and unintentional conduct.257 The 
purpose of the ADEA is to prohibit age discrimination against persons 40 years and 
older. Section 626 provides the various remedies available for a court to order in the 
circumstances of a discrimination claim. The remedies available are not unusual – 
they include: compelling employment, reinstatement or promotion; or enforcing the 
liability for sums of money deemed to be unpaid; and damages.258 An interesting 
distinction arises in only permitting damages as a remedy to employees whose 
employer wilfully discriminated against them on the ground of age.259 Therefore, 
when the employer conducts himself bona fide, the law follows a traditional 
restitution approach restoring the employee to the position he or she was in before 
the harm. The complementary perspective is that when an employer’s actions are 
mala fide, the liability is greater without being punitive. Therefore, the ADEA places 
no limits on the compensation that can be awarded, but does make provision for 
diminishing the liability of bona fide employers.  
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The CRA provides a general prohibition of discrimination to employees on the 
grounds of race, colour, religion, sex, or national origin by making it an unlawful 
employment practice to use such a ground in the decision-making process.260 In this 
legislation the distinction of intentional or unintentional conduct determines whether 
there is a remedy at all. The employer must have intentionally committed an unlawful 
employment practice by discriminating in order for the employee to access the 
remedies available.261 If the employer is found to have acted intentionally, the 
remedies available are reinstatement or re-employment, with or without back pay, 
and there is no limitation.262 This offers great protection to a bona fide employer as 
they will have no liability. 
 
Second, this dissertation will discuss another two statutes that offer similar 
remedies: the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and the Immigration Reform 
and Control Act of 1986.263 The IRCA intends to, amongst many purposes, offer 
some protection to employees from discrimination on the ground of their immigration 
status. Specifically, when an employer is guilty of wrongful employment practices 
based on the employee’s immigration status, the remedies available are 
reinstatement or re-employment, with or without back pay.264  
 
The ADA is designed to protect disabled employees from being discriminated 
against in the workplace. The statute states that any just remedy may be ordered to 
correct the wrong done to a disabled employee, but specifically lists reinstatement 
and re-employment, with or without back pay, as options.265 Interestingly, there is no 
limitation placed on the total sum of compensation an employee may be awarded 
under either statute; however, there is a limitation inserted into both pieces of 
legislation which limits the time in which back pay can accrue. The ADA and the 
IRCA stipulate that the maximum time period for which back pay can be considered 
is two years.266 This serves to limit the employer’s liability by not allowing the court to 
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consider a time period for back pay longer than two years, following the filing of the 
claim. However, the employee is not limited in additional remedies, such as 
damages. 
 
The last three statutes put forward the use of any remedy without any limit or 
qualification: the Equal Pay Act of 1963, the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, 
and the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008.267 The WPA and the 
CPSIA both offer protection to employees that make protected disclosures and, 
thereafter, are subjected to adverse treatment. The WPA protects publicly employed 
employees and the CPSIA protects privately employed employees making 
disclosures on the safety of products. Both statutes state that reinstatement is the 
primary remedy, with re-employment as the secondary choice if necessary.268 It is 
implied that if dismissal occurred, one of the above remedies must be awarded. 
Furthermore, the WPA and the CPSIA permit the award of any reasonably 
foreseeable harm and costs, and there is no limit to these awards.269  
 
Lastly, the EPA has the purpose of making the difference in pay of employees 
performing the same or similar work in the same workplace a blanket wrongful act. 
The statute then specifies the grounds on which an employer can increase an 
employee’s remuneration over another – all grounds are performance-based. The 
statute also gives grounds that will always be illegal if they are the basis of 
remunerating employees differently. The remedy provision stipulates that when a 
claim is found to have merit, an employee earning less for similar work based on that 
employee’s gender (for example), the difference in earnings is payable to the 
disadvantaged employee for the entirety of the wrongful differentiation.270 This award 
is only limited by the length of time the illegal practice was in place.  
 
The United States tends towards offering a full range of remedies for all 
employment claims. There is also a trend of putting little to no limits on these 
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awards. However, there is also an emphasis on predominantly only awarding the 





The Canadian legal system is one of the most similar to our own. This foreign 
jurisdiction will always be beneficial to use for comparison to South African law. 
Again, as with the United States of America, Canada has a well-developed and 
extensive Constitution which all laws must promote.271 A country with such similarity 
in this respect to South Africa will always lend itself to being a useful comparator in 
statutory developments based on constitutional infringements. 
 
This dissertation will only discuss various sections of a single piece of legislation 
from Canada, as it is the primary source of law for employment matters and is 
applicable to the entire country. As with the United States, there are further laws 
created by the lower governmental bodies from each of the different regions within 
Canada, but these are not nationally applicable. Canada’s primary statute for labour 
related matters is called the Canada Labour Code.272  
 
From sections 94 to 98 of the Code, the legislation makes provision for unfair 
practices relating to trade union involvement. This includes everything from an 
employer treating an employee unfavourably (due to his or her trade union 
involvement) to a trade union preventing an employee’s membership. Section 99 
then provides the remedies for each of the various unfair practices. The different 
remedies permitted by the Code for different circumstances are: requiring the 
employer to pay compensation to the employee, not exceeding what the employee 
would have earned in the time passed, were it not for the unlawful practice; 
reinstatement with back pay limited to what the employee would have earned were 
the unlawful practice not to have occurred; re-employment, continue to employ, or 
allow to return to previously held duties along with a compensatory payment to the 
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employee of what they would have earned were it not for the unlawful practice; to 
immediately rescind any disciplinary action in addition to a compensation payment 
made to the employee equal to the value of any penalty that may have been 
imposed; and the reinstatement of any benefits taken away under an unlawful 
practice.273 
 
Sections 240-241 of the Code govern the laws relating to the prohibition on 
unjust dismissal. Section 242 of the Code then provides the possible remedies 
available to an employee that have been found to have been unjustly dismissed. The 
remedies are: the payment of compensation to the unjustly dismissed employee, but 
limited to the remuneration the employee would have received were it not for the 
dismissal; the reinstatement of the employee; or any other award that is equitable to 
order of the employer so to remedy or counteract the damage caused by the 
dismissal.274 No limit is placed on the latter remedy. However, it is likely that it can be 
assumed to take similar form to the Code as a whole and the other remedies – that 
is, it would be limited to the deficit that was caused to the employee by the dismissal. 
 
What can be concluded from the selection of Canadian remedies available is the 
law only seeks to place the employee in precisely the same position as he or she 
was in before the wrongful conduct of the employer. There is a specific focus on the 
loss suffered by the employee. Only for unjust dismissals is there a possibility of 
perhaps compensation greater than simply financial loss. For example, if the conduct 
caused the employee harm, this remedy could offer a creative solution or an 
additional monetary sum. 
 
(iii) United Kingdom 
 
Given the history of South Africa being so closely linked to the United Kingdom at 
one point in time, our country has adopted many aspects of English law throughout 
our legal system. Therefore, despite the fact that our separation of powers and 
sovereign authority notably differ, the United Kingdom is always influential on South 
African law when there is call for development. 
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The United Kingdom is similar to Canada in that they have opted for a single 
primary labour law statute that is comprehensive across most employment-related 
issues. The statute is titled the Employment Rights Act 1996.275 This dissertation will 
refer to several sections which create a picture of the type of remedies the United 
Kingdom offers. 
 
Most unlawful acts by an employer are remedied or have the option to be 
remedied with a compensation payment to the employee.276 In the case of 
dismissals there are also the traditional remedies of reinstatement or re-
employment.277 Therefore, the remedies are not unique to the United Kingdom, but 
what is interesting about remedies is the specific limitations placed on some of the 
compensation awards.278  
 
In certain cases, mainly pertaining to when an employee discharges a duty that 
is in a representative capacity of other employees, and is dismissed for fulfilling such 
duties, there is a minimum compensation award that must be ordered by the court. 
Such cases include when an employee carries out duties to implement health and 
safety measures or when an employee performs the function of a trustee on an 
occupational pension scheme.279 In these cases, the court is obligated to give a 
minimum award of £14250.280  
 
Apart from a few exceptions, all unfair dismissals carry a maximum monetary 
award limitation of £78335.281 There is a further limitation placed on unfair dismissals 
that works in combination with the monetary maximum, a limitation of 12 months’ 
remuneration – whichever is the lower applies.282 The exceptional cases carry no 
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limitation and are of a serious nature: cases involving health and safety issues and 
cases involving protected disclosures.283 Therefore, the United Kingdom employs 
monetary minimums and maximums in certain cases, as well as a limit in terms of 
months of remuneration. 
 
(c) Replacing the ‘Remuneration’ Cap with a ‘Monetary’ Cap 
 
The United Kingdom is the only foreign jurisdiction of the three discussed above 
which employs the same limitation measure as South Africa – the limit in terms of 
months of remuneration. For the most part, the foreign jurisdictions place either very 
little limitation on compensation or none at all. As discussed in Chapter V, in South 
Africa we have a need for some form of limitation to lessen the potential liability of 
employers (should compensation be awarded) because of the agreement reached 
when drafting the legislation.284 However, there are some ideas worth considering 
from the United States and the United Kingdom. Canada will not be considered given 
its practice is not to limit compensation awards. 
 
 The United Kingdom was the only foreign jurisdiction to impose limitations onto 
its compensation awards. One of the limits was in terms of the employee’s 
remuneration – this is clearly not viable as it is consistent with our current law which 
was shown to be unconstitutional in Chapter V. This jurisdiction uses another 
limitation, however. The United Kingdom limits certain compensation claims with a 
maximum recoverable monetary value. It is this solution that this dissertation will 
seek to adopt. 
 
Section 194 of the LRA could substitute the “equivalent of 12 months’ 
remuneration” and “equivalent of 24 months’ of remuneration” for pre-determined 
monetary values. If this solution were to be accepted by the legislature, it would be 
upon them to determine the appropriate values for insertion, with regard to the South 
African context. 
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A further variation of this solution could be to differentiate limiting values for 
business size. Adjusting the application of laws based on the size of a business is 
commonplace within South African commercial law – and especially labour law. The 
LRA, for example, differentiates between business size when a business decides to 
retrench employees. Businesses with over 50 employees will need to adhere to more 
onerous processes than those that have 49 or less.285 A further example, from the 
EEA, is that only businesses with a minimum specified turnover are subject to the 
affirmative action provisions within the statute (the turnovers vary depending on the 
sector the business operates within).286 
 
The legislature could opt to simply substitute monetary values in place of the 
current text limiting by the equivalent of 12 or 24 months’ remuneration. However, 
the common choice in statutory drafting, if a monetary value is involved, is to state 
that the value is to be determined by the Minister of Labour and will be published in 
the Government Gazette. Whether caused by a shift in the economy that influences 
employment trends, or caused by basic economic fluctuations of inflation, the real 
value of money shifts over time. This method of setting various applicable monetary 
values is useful as it allows the values to change as necessary. An example of 
where this is used is in the Basic Conditions of Employment Act.287 Section 6 of the 
BCEA discusses the limited application of the relevant chapter. Section 6(3) of the 
BCEA makes use of the abovementioned method in limiting the chapter’s application 
by stating that: 
 
‘[t]he Minister [of Labour] must, on the advice of the Commission, make a 
determination that excludes the application of this Chapter or any provision of it to 
any category of employees earning in excess of an amount stated in that 
determination.’ 
 
The current determination provides the threshold value at R205 433.30.288 In 2012, it 
was determined to be R183 008.00.289 Therefore, it is an effective method of drafting 
more permanent legislation while allowing it to stay appropriate and relevant through 
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289 Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997: Determination: Earnings Threshold Government 





use of subordinate legislation. Another example of this method of placing monetary 
values into legislation is in the recent amendments to the LRA.290 Section 198A(2) of 
the LRA provides that the various sections regulating the different forms of temporary 
employment only apply to employees that earn less than the threshold value 
determined in terms of s 6(3) of the BCEA.291 Therefore, this is a practice used 
currently by the legislature. 
 
 This method of limiting the compensation awardable in employment matters with 
a maximum monetary value would fulfil the purpose of s 194 of the LRA and still 
provide a limitation on the potential financial risk of employers. It could also be easily 
achieved by allowing the value to be determined by the Minister of Labour, as the 
Minister already does this for other statutes. Furthermore, it would allow the limit to 
increase or decrease in value, depending on the trends or needs that arise within the 
economy – without any additional drafting of legislation. The most important factor of 
this solution is that by instituting a monetary value that applies to all employees 
equally, there is no differentiation in terms of an employee’s earning capabilities. 
 
 The alternative form of limiting compensation that is proposed would be very 
similar in practical effect to what our law currently provides. There will only be 
another form of limitation. Except the new limitation would not unfairly discriminate 
against any employee bringing an employment dispute. Furthermore, the alternative 
recommendation would give an employer a better idea of the potential liability he or 
she may incur. The remuneration an employer allocates to an employee should not 
be synonymous with his or her potential financial risk – this can only discourage 
employers from allocating more generous wages than necessary to keep the 
employee. 
 
(d) Capping by Applying a Form of Prescription 
 
The United States provides for a limitation to the period for which back pay may be 
claimed. Back pay is not relevant in this discussion; however, the concept of limiting 
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by applying a form of prescription is an interesting possibility that will be explored 
below. 
 
The method of limiting compensation awards with a monetary sum is submitted 
as the optimal solution in the opinion of this dissertation. However, there is another 
plausible approach to limiting employers’ potential financial risk without creating 
inconsistency with the Constitution. It is conceivable that when the drafters of the 
LRA formulated s 194 of the LRA to be capped in terms of 12 or 24 months’ 
remuneration, they were attempting, amongst other intentions, to limit the period for 
which the employee could claim. However, the wording reaches further than this. 
The purpose of s 194 of the LRA could be achieved by placing a limitation on the 
time period which may be considered when the judicial officer is assessing a claim. 
Therefore, if further harm were to occur after the passing of a certain period, it 
cannot be considered within the assessment of the factors of fairness or loss. Only 
conduct or loss occurring within the specified period would be relevant to the dispute. 
This adaption of the United States approach would limit the potential liability of 
employers by ensuring that they are never liable for remote or far-reaching harms 
and losses which are a result of the infringement to the right to fair labour practices. 
This dissertation advances the opinion that this approach would also assist the 
interpretive element of s 194 of the LRA. The emphasis would be placed on the 
recent events that were the actual cause of the right infringement, and remove the 
focus from the total loss suffered by the employee. This approach also causes no 
differentiation between employees on the basis of their remuneration, it simply limits 
the extent of what may be considered by the judicial officer. 
 
CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSION 
 
South Africa’s historical and current economic reality is that of entrenched racial and 
gender inequality. For this reason, our Constitution was founded on concepts of 
eradicating inequality and pursuing substantive equality.292 No legal provision or 
practice which aggravates the systemic racial and gender disadvantage can validly 
function in this constitutional context. Common sense dictates that we recognise the 
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disadvantages that black persons and women face in the workplace every day. 
However, the statistics compound this knowledge to reveal that every effort of, and 
call for, affirmative action for designated groups is justified. South Africa is simply 
entombed in the consequences of our history.293 Until it can be proven that inequality 
in South Africa is no longer coloured by a racial and engendered divide, 
remuneration must not be utilised as a measure without subsequent justification. 
Unless a person’s remuneration is directly applicable to the use of remuneration 
differentiation, remuneration will always unfairly indirectly discriminate on the 
grounds of race and gender. Essentially, the moment remuneration as a measure or 
standard is invoked, it will trigger a prima facie case of unfair indirect discrimination.  
 
South Africa’s economic status quo may change in future, but as can be seen 
from the statistics discussed in Chapter III, the discrimination caused by 
remuneration differentiation will not be removed in the near future. 
 
The two approaches to quantifying compensation that we currently have in our 
law are both severely lacking – neither approach embodies the intentions and 
purposes of the LRA. The ‘Sui Generis’ approach was established in Chapter IV to 
unfairly indirectly discriminate on the grounds of race and gender by quantifying 
compensation in terms of months of remuneration. For this reason, any further use of 
this approach should cease to occur due to its infringing the Constitution. The Loss-
based approach does not unfairly discriminate and, therefore, its continued use 
would not offend the Constitution. However, it does not promote the intentions of the 
LRA. The correct approach to compensation quantification is the compromise 
approach. Compensation must, most importantly, not be quantified in terms of an 
employee’s remuneration. Secondly, compensation must remedy the infringement of 
the employee’s right to fair labour practices by having the award be “just and 
equitable”.  
 
The limitation on compensation under s 194 of the LRA is unconstitutional in its 
remuneration-based limitation of the potential value of an employee’s award. If black 
persons and women are systemically denied access to the same employment 
                                            





opportunities as white persons and men, a statistically significant number of persons 
from protected groups are disadvantaged by having their compensation capped in 
terms of their earning ability. However, as it is necessary to have some form of 
limitation placed on the potential liability of employers for compensation awards, a 
maximum monetary value is the most appropriate solution. 
 
The case law analysed and the statistics collected in researching this 
dissertation demonstrate that these concepts are not merely theoretical. Parliament 
has clearly accepted this notion by pursuing reassessment of its legislation’s adverse 
impacts.294 Reassessment of the consequences of post-1994 laws is necessary and 
welcomed in the present atmosphere of South Africa. In order to pursue the goals of 
our Constitution of reaching a state of equality between all persons, any law or 
practice that seeks to overlook, preserve, or even aggravate inequality must be 
addressed and reviewed.  
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